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INTRODUCTION
one of the key problems in the analysis and planning of
any transport properties and facilities is estimating the future
volume of traffic that may be expected to use these properties
and facilities. Estimates of this kind are now being made regu-
larly as the transport system continues to expand. The future
planning, implementation and operation of a successful trans-
portation system requires accurate and realistic forecasts of
traffic volumes. To achieve optimal policies, the planner needs
to be able to predict the effect of alternate decisions.
Although the planning process involves much more than a
forecast of the future traffic statistics, these statistics pro-
vide the essential quantitative dimensions for the planning
process. Forecasts of expected traffic are an essential prereq-
uisite to long-range planning. The link between planning and
forecasting lies in recognizing that in order to bring an expec-
ted situation under control, the planner must be provided with
the entire spectrum of situations that could be anticipated and,
hence, could be planned for. The reasonableness and reliabil-
ity of these traffic statistics is, therefore, of vital impor-
tance to the planner.
This study investigates the North Atlantic passenger
travel demand.* The final goal is to make a forecast of the
passenger traffic on this route. It is believed that such a
*The word "demand" is used in the marketing sense. "De-
mand" in economics refers to a schedule relating the quantity
demanded with price, whereas in the marketing sense, it refers
to the total industry sales with a given level of price, adver-
tising, level of income, etc.
forecast would prove to be a critical tool for long-range plan-
ning of transport properties and facilities on both sides of
the Atlantic. For this reason, it is important to be well-
informed about the technical and economic factors which will de-
termine and limit the travel volume, especially for manufactur-
ers of aircraft, domestic and international airlines, and the
government. Governments, for example, must be provided with
traffic forecasts if they are to provide adequate ground faci-
lities and air traffic control systems.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is threefold:
1) To identify, explain, and evaluate the critical
factors which have influenced the North Atlantic
air travel demand in the past and those which may
become important in the next fifteen years,
2) To develop an analytical model to estimate the
structural parameters of the North Atlantic air
travel demand equation, and
3) To make a reliable and realistic forecast of the
air travel demand on the North Atlantic for the
period 1970 through 1985.
Methodology
Since World War II the demand for North Atlantic travel
has grown immensely as a result of reductions in air fares, im-
provements in the quality of air service, and increases in in-
come on both sides of the Atlantic. Chapter II discusses the
influence of some of these factors on travel demand. Extensive
use is made of airline passenger surveys to support the relevance
of these factors as they contribute to the travel growth. Most
of the surveys relate to the U.S. passenger demand and generally
concentrate on the various socio-economic characteristics of air-
line passengers. The two most widely-used surveys in this area
were carried out by the University of Michigan , Survey Research
Centr4 and the Port of New York Authority 2, Aviation Economics
Division.
The analysis incorporates both time-series and cross-
sectional data. The time-series traffic data was obtained from
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) annual reports
and the cross-sectional traffic data from the U.S. Department of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reports,
The economic data was obtained from the publication of the U.S,
Department of Commerce and the United Nations. The accuracy,
extent, and limitations of the data are discussed in detail in
Chapter III - The independent variables are projected in Chapter
V, Section 5.2.
An attempt is made in Chapter IV to relate these vari-
ables to the volume of travel by means of an analytical model.
The number and type of variables in the model are limited by the
quality and availability of the data. The mathematical formu-
lation relates the total 'North Atlantic passenger traffic volume
to two sets of independent variables: those related to the eco-
nomic environment and those inherent to the txansport mode. As
detailed in Chapter I, the basic underlying hypothesis is the
existence of a functional relationship between total North At-
lantic passenger travel volume (air plus sea) and socio-economic
and transport characteristics on both sides of the Atlantic. The
model takes into account both European and U.S. economic data,
weighted by the average proportion of the traffic generated by
each country during the period 1951 through 1969.
Chapter IV presents the results of the various models
tested and a discussion of the significance of the empirical.
calibration of these models. The analytical model selected is
then used to forecast the future traffic as shown in Chapter V.
This chapter closes with a discussion of the projected traffic
growth if a decision were made to abandon the supersonic trans-
port aircraft, a topic which is further discussed in Appendix E.
Advanced aviation technology will influence the traffic
growth. Possible areas of such improvements are pointed out in
Appendix A through the use of sensitivity analysis. Appendix B
shows the details of raw data incorporated in the model. Appen-
dix C gives brief details of the computer program used to ana-
lyze this data, and Appendix D briefly highlights the results of
two studies regarding the impact of aircraft noise regulation on
airline economics.
Scope
The analysis concerns the passenger traffic on the North
Atlantic between U.S. and Europe only. Although direct passen-
ger traffic to and from Canada is not included, on-line traffic
from Europe destined for the U.S. via Canada is included. Simi-
larly, on-line traffic in the opposite direction via Canada is
also included. In this study the words traffic, volume of trav-
el, and travel demand all refer to the number of passengers in
both directions. The future forecast is also presented in terms
of the number of passengers in both directions.
Historical time-series data was taken from and including
the year 1951, a period which eliminates the possibly abnormal
influences of World War II and its aftermath. The forecast pe-
riod includes the years 1970 through 1985, a total of 15 years.
Although it is difficult to look too far ahead in the future
without sacrificing reliability, the 15-year horizon was chosen
for two reasons. First, during the next 15 years, the airline
industry should have completed another major transition through
the introduction of new and more sophisticated flight equipment.
The operations in scheduled service of the supersonics, jumbo
subsonics, and some type of V/STOL aircraft should be more or
less routine. Secondly, if this forecast is to be used for
properties and facilities planning, a planner is forced to se-
lect a time horizon on the order of 10 to 15 years, since it
takes time to plan and build these facilities.
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CHAPTER I
METHODOLOGY FOR FORECASTING
The techniques for forecasting air travel demand can be
broadly classified into three categories: judgemental, mechani-
cal, and analytical. When using the judgemental method, the ana-
lyst makes an educated guess of the travel demand for the fore-
cast period. The analyst's estimate is based on his experience
of the past volume of traffic and his intuition of the future.
Although the analyst does not use any specific travel demand
model, he intuitively takes into account the factors which influ-
ence travel demand and weights these factors according to his
judgement.
The mechanical method assumes that future travel demand is
a time function of past experience. The application of the me-
chanical method varies from the simple extrapolation of histor-
ical trends to the use of complex mathematical growth curves,
such as the Logistic and Gompertz curves. These are known as
intrinsic models. Time is taken to be the only predictor vari-
able, reflecting the interplay of economic, industry, and govern-
ment activities. In other words, the mechanical method assumes
that the demand generated over time is a function of time alone.
The use of direct extrapolation, in general, is not con-
sidered a satisfactory method for forecasting. It merely indi-
cates that parameters exist which have influenced the demand in
the past at a rate which is a function of time. it is, there-
fore, difficult to project the demand based on time alone unless
one knows these time-based parameters and the extent of their
influence. It is also difficult to forecast the time at which
these influences may cease to operate or their effects will
change. For example, it is well-known that the sea traffic on
the North Atlantic has been declining steadily. A direct mechan-
ical extrapolation of this trend will produce a total disappear-
ance of the sea traffic on this route after a certain time. A
reasonable forecast, on the other hand, would set a mini-
mum on the passenger market patronizing the water mode.
The analytical method explores and analyzes parameters
which have affected the historical travel demand pattern and
those parameters which may influence the future travel demand.
This method utilizes past relationships between travel volume
and other variables such as income and fares. These are known
as the regression techniques of projecting travel volumes. It
should be noted that although time can enter the relationship
as a predictor variable, it cannot be the sole predictor vari-
able, for then the model would be intrinsic, a time-series mod-
el. The analytical method employs the dependent variable
traffic as it relates to the logically relevant independent vari-
ables through a mathematical expression. It must be emphasized,
however, that statistical correlation does not by any means imply
cause and effect.
The analytical method thus erects the basic framework for
an analytical model. The results of this study are based on an
analytical model which is used to test the following hypothesis:
"There exists a functional relationship between the
North Atlantic travel demand and two sets of exogenous
independent variables: socio-economic and transport.
Furthermore, a reliable and realistic long-range fore-
cast of this travel demand can be determined through
a forecast of the related independent variables."
The skeleton of the analytical model takes shape through
identification of the logically relevant independent variables.
The appropriate historical functional relationship between the
dependent and independent variables is then derived through
experimentation with the past data and the use of regression
techniques. For a base period, various functional relationships
are empirically manipulated. The object is to find the rela-
tionship which gives least variance between the derived demand
and the actual demand. The steps involved are the following:
1. Observed relationships between travel demand, eco-
nomic, and transport variables are formulated in terms
of a set of testable hypotheses.
2. The hypotheses are translated into precise mathemati-
cal equations.
3. The parameters of the equation are estimated from
past data for both dependent and the independent
variables.
4. The values of the dependent variable of the model
are forecast using projected values of the indepen-
dent variables.
5. The relative importance of each of the explanatory
variables is assessed.
6. The model is evaluated in terms of its effectiveness
to explain and forecast travel demand. This step
may lead to a reformulation of the model and, hence,
repetition of the first five steps.
There are three fundamental assumptions underlying
the analytical approach. First, it is assumed that most of the
variation in the dependent variable can be explained by using
a few selected independent variables. This assumption is neces-
sary due to the fact that we have limited data. Furthermore,
in many cases it is difficult if not impossible to quantify all
the variables even though we know that these variableshave in-
fluenced the travel demand in the past and will continue to do
so in the future. The second assumption is that it is easier
and/or more accurate to forecast the independent variables than
the dependent variable. Data for the projected values of these
independent variables are obtained directly from external
sources, giving the analyst two advantages. First of all, cer-
tain external specialists in various branches of the government,
private industry, and/or academic institutions are probably
better equipped to produce projections. Secondly, the results
of this study are to be used to aid the planning process of
these external sectors which are simultaneously planning for
other activities. Therefore, the projections of economic acti-
vity should be consistent. The third assumption is that the
functional relationship will remain valid throughout the fore-
cast period.
The accuracy and reliability of the analytical method
depends on the following:
1. The accuracy, reliability, consistency and extent
of the historical data,
2. The accuracy and reliability of the forecast of
the independent variables, and
3. The validity of the assumption that the historical
relationship between the variables will remain
the same during the forecast period.
The use of a mathematical model does not eliminate
the need for estimating time-projected values. Estimation is
merely shifted to variables which might be predicted with rea-
sonable accuracy and reliability. The primary purpose of the
model is to reduce through computation, the predicting of travel
to the predicting of the independent variables appearing in the
model. It should be noted that the use of a model combines er-
rors in the variables into a single error in the traffic predic-
tion and that the extent of error will depend on the relative
accuracy of the prediction used for each variable.
The third analytical model tested in Chapter TV is used
to determine the total volume of passenger traffic on the North
Atlantic. This total passenger market is then distributed among
the various categories from which it was made up, in other words,
sea traffic, air traffic on charter flights, and on scheduled
flights. In this study forecast of air travel demand is based
on total travel by air. Business and pleasure travel are not
separated for the following reasons:
1. Lack of adequate statistics prevents separate indepth
analyses of business and pleasxpre travel demand.
2. The object of the study is to produce a macro-
forecast and not individual city-pair forecast. A few
markets are heavily business-oriented, a few pleasure-
oriented, but most represent a mixture of both types
of travel.
3. Port of New York Authority (PONYA) surveys have shown
that in the transatlantic market the ratio between
business and pleasure travel has remained fairly
stable at 30/70 during the whole post-war period
(Table 1.1). An increase in the ratio in any given
market is assumed to be counterbalanced by the decline
in the ratio in another market. Furthermore, histor-
ical changes in fare and trip time have influenced
both the business and pleasure travelers in constant
TABLE 1.1
Breakdown of Transatlantic Traffic
Business vs. Pleasure
Main Purpose of Trip Year
1956
31 %Business
Pleasure
Other
Total 100 %
1963
25 %
63
12
100 %
Source: PONYA
1966
26 %
58
16
100 %
proportions. If the business and pleasure passenger
traffic behaved differently with respect to reduction
in price and trip time, this difference would already
have been established.
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CHAPTER II
FACTORS AFFECTING THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRAVEL DEMAND
Factors affecting the North Atlantic travel demand can be
grouped into two broad categories; socio-economic and transport.,
Socio-economic variables are those inherent to the general econos-
ic, geographic, social and political environment. Transport
variables, on the other hand, are those inherent to the transport
mode, that is, cost, travel time, comfort, safety and convenience.
The volume of passenger traffic is influenced by a complex inter-
action of one or more of these variables.
2.1 Socio-Economic Variables
Factors in this group which can be related to the growth in
passenger traffic over the North Atlantic fall into the follqw-
ing categories:
Population
Economic Wealth
Social
Education
Attraction for Europe/U.S.A.
Political and Special Events
Government Regulation
2.1.1 Population
The data used in this study refers to the seventeen countries
shown in Appendix Table B.l. For those European countries con-
sidered, the population grew from 279.6 million to 317.1 million
during the 15 year period of 1951 to 1966, an annual average
growth rate of 0.85 percent.3 The population of the U.S. for
this same period increased from 154.9 million to 196.9 million,
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an average annual growth of 1.65 percent. According to the long-
range population forecast produced by the U.S. National Planning
Association, this population is expected to increase to 235.2
million by 1980, an annual average growth of 1.3 percent. It
stands to reason that other things being equal, North Atlantic
traffic would increase in proportion to the population growth.
Wheatcroft4 has shown that there are two other demographic
factors which have influenced the traffic over the North Atlantic:
the tendency of the U.S. population to shift towards the West
Coast and the influence of immigration. Besse and Demas5 in their
study reported that from 1940 to 1960 the centre of gravity of
the U.S. population moved 160 km westwards. This might be re-
garded as an adverse influence for European travel, since it
would imply that an increasing proportion of the U.S. population
lives nearer other competitive areas of pleasure travel (Hawaii
and the Orient). Wheatcroft, on the other hand, also points out
that these influences have partially been offset by other factors.
For example, in the period from 1952 to 1961 the proportion of
Atlantic travelers residing on the U.S. West Coast increased from
10 percent to 14 percent. The percentage is even higher today
due partly to the lower charter fares from the U.S. West Coast
to Europe.
European immigrants in the U.S. represent a significant po-
tential transatlantic market. Again, both Wheatcroft and Besse
and Demas report that this section of the U.S. population has
grown twice as fast as the rest of the population.
Table 2.1 shows the breakdown between U.S. and European
traffic. It is pointed out that U.S. citizen traffic includes
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals who are permanent residents
in the United States. For the nineteen year period from 1951 to
1969, U.S. citizens accounted for 61.7% of the North Atlantic
TABLE 2.1
North Atlantic Traffic Breakdown
(Thousands)
U.S.Citizens
52703
735.5
752.2
562.8
728.5
1142.6
1178.9
1382.8
1456.7
1724.1
1742.1
2009.5
2250.6
2529.0
2817.7
3190.6
3548.1
3873.7
4687.4
36885.1
Aliens
490.8
495.3
469.4
520.6
562.6
661.6
747.5
811.7
869.3
1026.0
1099.9
1228.1
1285.9
1637.2
1746.7
1928.6
2201.2
2388.7
2739.2
22910.3
Traffic represented in this table is the
air in both directions.
U.-S.Citizens As
a % of Total
51.8
59.7
6164
52.0
56.3
63.4
61.0
63.0
62.3
6206
61.2
6107
63.7
60.8
62.0
62.3
61.5
61.9
62.9
61.7
sum of sea and
Source: INS
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Total
market, and this percentage has been over sixty since 1956. The
data in Table 2.1 includes both air and sea traffic. Table 2.2
depicts data for air only. The ratio between the U.S. citizen
traffic and European citizen traffic remains virtually the same
as in Table 2.1.
European travelers account for almcs t forty percent of the
North Atlantic travel. Table 2.3 (air plus sea traffic) shows
tie breakdown of European travelers by country. For the nineteen
year period European travelers provided 38.6 percent of the traf-
fic, of which 11.9 percent was derived from the United Kingdom
alone. In other words the United Kingdom accounted for 30 per-
cent and the rest of Europe 70 percent of the total transatlantic
traffic originating in Europe.
2.1.2 Economic Wealth
Air travel demand is strongly determined by income, personal
income in the case of pleasure travel and GNP in the case of busi-
ness travel.
Pleasure Travel
There are at least three forms of per capita income that can
be entered into the demand equation: national income is equal to
domestic product at factor cost plus net factor income from a-
broad; disposable income is defined as personal income less
taxes; discretionary income is that portion of disposable income
in excess of the amount necessary to maintain a defined or his-
torical standard of living. This last type of income may be
saved or spent with no immediate impairment of living standards.
Thus it would appear that discretionary income would be a better
and more consistent predictor of air travel than either disposable
or national income. This study, however, utilizes national in-
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TABLE 2.2
U.S. and European Transatlantic Air Traffic
(Thousands)
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
U.S.
Citizens
191.4
293.2
364.5
492.7
578.8
641.8
723.9
901.3
1013.2
1277.9
1336.8
1580.0
1804.3
2126.2
2472.5
2875.5
3304.8
3687.3
4500.6
Aliens
134.7
162.7
177.6
194.2
229.7
304.3
401.9
483.7
583.7
743.4
810.2
935.3
1oo6.o
1364.3
1512.0
1690.9
2016.0
2225.9
2584.9
Total
326.1
455.9
542.1
686.9
808.5
94601
1125.8
1385.0
1596.9
2021.3
2147.0
2515.3
2810.3
3490.5
3984.5
4566.4
5320.8
5913.2
7085.5
Traffic represented in this table is by
directions.
Source: INS
U.S. Citizens
as a % of
Total Traffic
58.7 %
64.3
67.2
71.7
7106
67.8
64.3
65.1
63.4
63.2
6203
62.8
64.2
60.9
62.1
63.0
62.1
6z.4
63.5
air only in both
TABLE 2.3
European Transatlantic Traffic Breakdown
Country 1951-1969 Percent of Percent of'
Traffic(000) European Traffic Total Traffic
Belgium 532.7 2.3 % 0.9 %
Denmark 1100.0 4.8 1.8
France 2949.4 12.8 4.9
Germany 3212.9 13.9 5.4
Greece 377o2 1.6 0.6
Iceland 410.5 1.8 0.7
Ireland 811.5 3.5 1.4
Italy 1887.6 8.2 3.2
Netherlands 1725.7 7.5 2.9
Norway 280.8 1.2 0.5
Portugal 464.4 2.0 0.8
Spain 826.8 3.6 1.4
Sweden 298.8 1.3 0.5
Switzerland 552.2 2.4 0.9
United Kingdom 7124.8 30.9 11.9
Other Europe 484.4 2.1 0.8
Total Europe 23039.7 99.9% 38.6 %
Source: INS
come for the following reasons:
1. unavailability of consistent data for discretionary
income
2. difficulty of quantification of discretionary income
3. subjective definitions as to the size of discretionary
income 4.
Although data on disposable income per capita for the U.S. was
readily available, similar and consistent data for some of the
European countries was not available. On the other hand, each
year the United Nations publishes data on national income in
consistent form for the European countries and the U.S.
Prior to World War II, the majority of consumers had pur-
chasing power which did not provide sufficient discretionary in-
come to afford overseas travel. However, since 1948, industrial
expansion, international trade and real incomes of consumers have
increased sufficiently to create substantial discretionary in-
come. Various studies6,7 have shown that a factor which is even
more important than the level of personal income is the distribu-
tion of family income. Tables 2.4 and 2.5, constructed from
References 1 and 2, present the data.on income distribution in
current dollars.
Table 2.4 shows that whereas in 1956 seventeen percent of
the American traveling population had income less than $5,000 per
annum, in 1966 only seven percent of this population was earning
below this amount. The story is equally impressive for the
European travelers. The percentage of the population with less
than $5,000 income per annum fell from 33 percent to 19 percent
*
in the period 1963 to 1966 . Table 2.4 also indicates that
*The percentage refers to the population that is traveling
and not the whole population of the country.
TABLE 2.4
Distribution of Family Income
For Transatlantic Passengers
Year
1963 1966
17 % 10 % 7 %
Year
1956 1963 1966
33 % 19%
5000 -
9999
10000 -
14999
15000 -
19999
20000 + 27
26 21
22 22
11 14
31 36
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % - 100 % 100%
Source: PONYA
1956
4999
NA
NA
NA
TABLE 2.5
Percent of All Air Trips Taken by Adults
in Specified Income Group --- 1962
(Percent Distribution of Trips and Adults)
Annual Family Income
Under $4000
4000-5999
6000-9999
10000 +
Total
Number of Trips
Number of Adults
Percent of Adults
100
Percent of Trips
100
1743
5093
Source: Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan
while the money at the disposal of Europeans, even in the most
prosperous countries, is still considerably below that of
the U.S. citizens, the gap is tending to narrow, implying that
the ratio of Europeans to Americans on the North Atlantic may
change in the future.
The higher the income level, the greater the likelihood
of traveling abroad. In 1963, 42 percent of the traveling U.S.
citizens and 25 percent of the traveling Europeans had income
above $15,000. In 1966 this percentage of the population
increased to 60 percent for the U.S. and 31 percent for Europe.
The Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan1 has
attempted to measure the personal economic conditions of
travelers in order to measure the potential traffic. Even
though this survey was restricted to the U.S., it is felt that
positive conclusions applicable to other geographical areas
can be reached. The survey used a sampling of over 5093
respondents and measured the distribution per family income
of air travelers in 1962. The main conclusion reached was that
the percentage of air trips taken is correlated to personal
income; the higher the income, the higher the percentage of
travel (85% of all trips were taken by persons with an income
higher than $6,000 per year). See Table 2.5.
Some analysts prefer to use the distribution of family
income above a certain base level. Asher uses a base of $7,500;
in other words, the traveler's annual income is greater than or
equal to $7,500 and the greater the income (above $7,500) the
greater the chances of his taking the trip. Such a distribution
as this was not incorporated in the models for the following
reasons:
1. The base level is a subjective measure and analysts
differ in their views of its numerical value.
Furthermore, the level would vary by country.
2. The data is very sketchy on the distribution of
income especially for some of the European countries
considered in this study.
3. The variation in the income distribution is fairly
difficult to forecast accurately.
Business Travel
It appears that business travel is not sensitive to
personal income. Business reasons are not self-selected, and
although highly paid senior management executives travel more
than middle and lower level staff, income of the business traveler
seldom seems to directly influence the frequency and, in some
cases, the class of travel.
Business travel appears to depend,among other things,
on GNP and particularly on exports, imports, level of investment
abroad and balance of payments. It stands to reason that during
recessions the amount of business travel diminishes. Conversely,
during an expansion of the economy, business travel increases.
During recessions when corporate profits are down and costs
are rising, one of the means of reducing corporate costs is to
curtail business travel. It can be seen from this that a
relationship exists between the fluctuations in the economy on
both sides of the Atlantic and the traffic trend. However, this
relationship is very general, since fluctuations in the economy
do not exactly coincide with fluctuations in traffic. The
reason for this is twofold. First, there is never just one
factor at play. Every year's traffic is influenced by many
factors simultaneously. Secondly, there is a time lag between
the movement in the economy and the influence on traffic. To
attempt to predict this time lag accurately would require very
sophisticated techniques and numerous statistical data. It has
been suggested that a variable time lag should be considered.
The variation implied here is twofold. First, the time lag
should be different for the pleasure and business markets.
Secondly, it should reflect the economy at any given time as
being in the state of expansion, recession or normality. The
sophistication involved here is beyond the scope of the
models presented in this thesis. In order to sacrifice accuracy
for simplicity, a one-year lag was introduced in the first
two models, that is to say, last year's income was correlated
to this year's traffic.
The model incorporates GNP per capita as one of the
predictor variables. The advantages of using GNP are:
1. The economic conditions of two countries can be
compared on a consistent basis.
2. Fairly accurate historical data is available.
3. Many learned individuals and institutions have
produced future long-range forecasts to a high
degree of accuracy using the most sophisticated
methods available.
4. These long-range forecasts are continuously reviewed
and updated.
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2.1.3 Social
It has been stated previously that the level of income
is an explanatory variable which partially indicates the growth
of the North Atlantic pleasure travel demand. While higher income
families are more likely to travel, it is not income alone that
influences them to travel. This section introduces other
variables related to income which also influence the pleasure
travel demand.
North Atlantic travel has been traditionally associated
with the upper social class. It was initiated by the upper class,
since they were the only ones who could afford this luxury. it
was an expression of their life-style and a status symbol.
over the years the social lines have become less distinct.
Rising incomes, higher levels of education and greater leisure
time for those in the middle and lower class both in the U.S.
and Western Europe have led to some overlapping between social
classes. The impact of this has been an increase in the
proportion of the population with the desire and ability to take
a transatlantic trip.
Knowledge of the social class with which a consumer
affiliates and/or to which he aspires also provides an indication
of the likelihood of his traveling overseas. The middle class
considers North Atlantic travel prestigiousand a middle class
person normally aspires to develop purchasing habits and
attitudes similar to those of persons with higher social status.
This phenomenon also takes place within the same social
class. For example, having relatives, friends or business
accociates who traveled and enjoyed their trips appears to be
an important determinent of a person's decision to travel.
As a result of social pressures such as status-seeking and a
desire to conform, the travel decision of the individual may
be a reflection of his friends' and associates' vacation
preferences. This suggests the possibility that the analysis
of the travel demand should not be limited to the purchasing
power of the consumers and fares but should also include social
influences on consumer behaviour.
On the other hand, conformity, can have a negative
influence on the travel demand. For example, if a trend of
buying expensive cars and replacing them every year developed,
there probably would not be enough money left over for a North
Atlantic trip. Conformity, therefore, can be seen to have
a positive or a negative influence.
A certain amount of North Atlantic travel occurs
because of family ties and associations with specific social
groups. The decision to travel can be influenced by social
relations, that is, relations between an individual and various
groups of persons, such as members of a church or civic
association. This is discussed further in Section 2.1.5.
2.1.4 Education
The level of education attained has a high
correlation with income, occupation, social status, human wants,
buying habits and attitudes. The educated generally travel
more. Even when income is held constant, the better educated
population tends to outspend the lesser educated for all goods
and services. In addition, the better educated respond
strongly to innovations. Therefore, the amount of education
is increasingly important in estimating the demand for certain
products.
Higher education inspires an interest in and a desire
to see foreign places, and thus affects demand for North Atlantic
travel. This cultural pursuit is dependent on the exercise of
taste. As Triandafyllides6 points out, in an age when millions
travel abroad, the difference between a 3-week economy trip
to London-Paris-Rome and a 6-week trip to Athens and Istanbul
is not just the difference in cost but also in the sophistication
of the itinerary. Today, there is a phenomenon which is not
so much a pressure against heavy spending as a pressure to spend
money as educated men are supposed to spend it.
The vital role education plays in North Atlantic. travel
is substantiated by many surveys. For example, in a 1955 survey
of U.S. tourists in Europe, 57% were found to be college and
university graduates. Life magazine, in a survey in 1960 found
that 72 percent of the respondents sampled had some college
education (19 October 1960). National efforts to upraise the
level of education, which in turn influences the composition
of the work force, are expected to produce results after a
somewhat prolonged period of time, and thus, are considered
relevant for the present long-term forecast.
2.1.5 Attraction for Europe/U.S.A.
Europe has become increasingly attractive for the
U.S. citizens and visa-versa. This attraction, due in part to
heritage, culture, wars etc., has had a significant influence
on the transatlantic travel. Over the time period considered
in this study, the number of U.S. citizens traveling to Europe
as a percentage of all other countries increased from 20.5% in
1951 to 43.5% in 1969 (Table 2.6). Table 2.7 shows that for
Europeans traveling to the U.S. as a percentage of Europeans
traveling to all other countries, increased from 26.1% in 1951
to 41.3% in 1969.
The air travel market to Europe is the largest
overseas travel market from the U.S. Ethnic and family ties with
Europe are very strong, and as pointed out in Section 2.1.1, this
section of the U.S. population is growing twice as fast as the
rest of the population. In addition to this a significant number
of American ex-servicemen have been making trips to Europe,
often with their families.
2.1.6 Political and Special Events
Throughout the base period, there have been political
and special events which have exerted both positive and negative
influences on the travel demand. Examples of some of these
occuriences are given below. Although it is relatively easy to
catalog these phenomena, it is nevertheless, difficult to isolate
their exact influence on traffic. The process is further
complicated in years during which both positive and negative
events took place. In this model no separate account was taken
for these occurrences.
TABLE 2.6
Distribution of U.S. Citizen Traffic
(Both Ways)
To/From all other Traf
To/From Europe
Year (000)_
1951 191.4
1952 293.2
1953 364.5
1954 492.7
1955 578.8
1956 641.8
1957 723.9
1958 901.3
1959 1013.2
1960 1277.9
1961 1336.8
1962 1580.0
1963 1804.3
1964 2126.2
1965 2472.5
1966 2875.5
1967 3304.8
1968 3687.3
1969 4500.6
countries Euro
(000) Tot
934.4
1064.7
1056.1
13277
1675.1
1926.4
2172.2
2453.8
2758.0
3033.1
3107.9
3513.7
3968.3
4598.1
5546.1
6598.1
7700.6
8826.9
10340.5
fic To/From
pe as a % of
al Traffic
20.5
27.5
34.5
37.1
34.6
33.3
33.3
36.7
36.7
42.1
43.0
45.0
45.5
46.2
44.6
43.6
42.9
41.8
43.5
Source: INS
al Traffic
TABLE 2.7
Distribution of Alien Traffic
(Both Ways)
To/From The U.S.
Year (000)L
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
134.7
162.7
177.6
19403
229.6
304.3
401.9
483.7
583.7
743.4
810.2
93503
i006.o
1364.3
1512.0
1690.9
2016.0
2225.9
2584.9
To/From All Other
Countries (000)
516.5
582.5
708.3
661.5
764.8
919.9
1079.0
1337.3
1580.2
1868.5
1947.2
2238.5
2387.2
3058.8
3450.0
39909
4755.3
5333.6
6264.2
Traffic To/From
the U.S. as a %
of Total Traffic
26.1 %
27.9
25.1
29.4
30.0
33.1
37.2
36.2
36.9
39.8
41.6
41.8
42.1
44.6
43.8
42.4
42.4
41.7
41.3
Source: INS
Positive Factors
. 1950 Holy Year in Rome
. 1952 Olympics in Oslo and Helsinki
. 1958 Lourdes Centenary
Brussels Universal Exhibition
. 1960 Olympics in Rome
. 1964 New York World Fair
. 1967 Expo in Montreal
Negative Factors
. 1951 Korean Crisis
. 1953 Disturbances in East Berlin
. 1954 Algerian War
. 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Suez
. 1961 outrages in France
2.1.7 Government Regulation
Government regulation both in the U.S. and Europe has
had a great deal of indirect influence on the travel demand.
Three areas where this influence is significant are the
certification of route structure, regulation of fares charged and
regulation of aircraft operating rules.
The certification of U. S. darriers (and of
foreign carriers operating in the U.S.) is subject to the approval
of the CAB and the President when international operations are
involved. The President, for example, in addition to the economic
effects of carrier certification, must consider such factors as
the broad impact of international air transport on the national
defense of the U.S.
The second area of regulation is in the control of
international fares. The rate making machinery for most
international operations is not the "free market", but the
IATA, a price-fixing cartel. IATA sponsors Traffic Conferences
at which time rates for all cargo and passenger flights by IATA
members are established. Various members submit price schedules
for particular routes. A vote of all carriers which provide
service for these specific routes is then taken, and if the
vote is unanimously in favour of the rate, it becomes binding.
In the event that the vote is not unanimous, efforts are made to
reach agreement on a compromise price schedule. If no agreement
can be reached for a service, an "open-rate" situation prevails,
and the carriers are free to charge any rate consistent with
the aviation policy of their government.
When agreement has been reached on a particular rate,
each carrier submits this rate schedule to the appropriate
aeronautical agency in its country for approval. In the event
that an agency does not approve the schedule of the rates set
by the Traffic Conferences, IATA ordinarily will call supplementary
conferences in order to work out some new agreement which will
satisfy the dissident aeronautical authority.8
In the U.S., the Civil Aeronautics Board and the
President are empowered to control the entry of U.S. carriers
into any international market. Foreign governments also
control operation of their carriers outside of their own
boundaries. Since international transport rates are determined
by a price-fixing mechanism, both the structure and performance
of the international transport industry are substantially
affected by the broad air transport aims of many individual
countries.
The third area of regulation is concerned with aircraft
operating rules. The recent contraversial environmental issues
are an example of regulation in this area. Aircraft which are
designed and flown in accordance with government specification
regarding engine noise, sonic boom and pollution may cause an
increment in direct operating costs. This may or may not be
the case with aircraft presently in the design stage. However,
modification of B-707 and DC-8 type aircraft may require
expensive retrofits, Discussion of the impact of aircraft noise
regulation on airline economics is presented in Appendix D.
2.2 Transport Variables
Factors included in this group which can be related
to the growth in passenger traffic fall into the following
general categories:
. Trip Cost
. Trip Time
. Comfort, Spfety and Convenience
2.2.1 Trip Cost
The Marshallian law of demand is applicable to air
travel: consumers will buy more at lower prices and less at
higher prices, if other things are not different or do not
change.
Both personal and business air travel demand is
dependent upon total trip cost and varies inversely with the
trip cost as compared with other prices. The fact that the
total cost of a trip has been declining since 1960 is shown in
Table 2.8. This is due to the decline in fares and the decline
in average expenditures while traveling in Europe. The downward
trend in expenditures abroad is explained partially by the
growing number of U.S. citizens with limited funds who are now
traveling and partially by the fact that air travelers have been
staying shorter periods in Europe and spending less. The average
stay has declined from about 66 days in 1950 to 45 days in 1963.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for Europeans traveling to the
United States.
Apart from slight fluctuations, the transportation cost
for a North Atlantic trip has also been steadily decreasing.
Table 2.8 shows that the average round-trip transportation cost
has been reduced from $610 in 1951 to $455 in 1968. This cost
represents the average for sea and air travel. The second column
in Table 2.9 shows the air fare for a typical scheduled carrier
for New York-London round trip.
Yield is defined as revenue per revenue passenger mile.
To compute yield the accounting procedure is to divide the total
passenger revenue for a given time in a given market by the total
revenue passenger miles in that time period. Only revenue
passengers are counted. The product of one passenger traveling
one mile constitutes a revenue passenger mile. Table 2.9 gives
the historical trend of North Atlantic yield for a typical
scheduled carrier. New York to London round trip is normally
taken to be the basic gateway-to-gateway transatlantic routing.
The product of yield and length of haul produces the approximate
air fare. Although this method is by no means exact, it will
suffice to illustrate the downward trend in transatlantic air
fares. Yield on the North Atlantic varies from airline to
TABLE 2.8
Average Cost of a North Atlantic Trip
Transportation
Year Cost
$ 6101951
1952
i953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
630
641
628
640
660
666
655
650
660
630
595
550
520
510
487
460
455
Expenses While in Europe
And Iediterranean
$ 759
767
812
858
889
867
867
876
850
840
760
705
650
650
610
583
562
510
Total Cost
$ 1369
1397
1453
1467
1529
1527
1533
1531
1500
1500
1390
1300
1200
1170
1120
1071
1022
965
Source: Ref.(6) and the Annual Reports on Foreign Travel
published in the Survey of Current Business, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
TABLE 2.9
A Typical Cost of a Transatlantic Trip (Air)
New York - London
Cost
594 $
580
548
533
526
519
521
515
515
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Percent Change
in cost
- 2.4 %
- 5.5
- 0.7
2.0
- 1.3
- 1.3
+ 0.4
- 1.2
0.0
- 8.3
- 507
+ 0.7
- 9.8
- 1.7
- 4.3
-
3.2
- 1.4
-3.0
Source: Trans World Airlines
Yield (Revenue per revenue passenger mile) is multiplied by the
round trip length of haul to obtain approximate cost of the air
fare between New York and London. This method is by no means
exact, but, nevertheless serves the purpose of illustration.
Yield
8.61 #
8.40
7.94
7.88
7.73
7062
7052
7055
7.46
7047
6.84
6.45
6.49
5.85
5.75
5.51
5033
5*26
5.10
448
404
397
380
368
363
352
airline due partly to variation in the route structure
of each carrier and partly to the on-line traffic mix. The
statistics for the Atlantic Division of Trans World Airlines
shown in Table 2.9 depict the influence on yield of fare
reductions and dilution due to passengers downgrading their
tickets to lower class fares.
The reduction in air fares has been important in
attracting new and repeat travelers. They have made it more
attractive for consumers who had never traveled the North Atlantic
before and others to take more frequent trips. Every reduction
in fares between 1952 and 1963 was accompanied by an increased
rate of growth of passenger traffic. In 1952, air passenger
traffic increased about 33.5 percent over 1951, doubtless due
in part to the introduction of tourist class service on May 1,
1952 (Table 2.10). Tourist class rate was $417 compared to $610
for the first class for round-trip fare from New York to London
during the off-season (October-March). This 31.6% reduction of
$193 had a tremendous impact on increasing the share of
passengers going by air.
On April 1, 1958, with the introduction of economy class,
air travel cost dropped $113 below the 1958 tourist class and
$259 below the 1958 first class on the New York-London round trip.
The 24.2% increase in air passenger volume in 1958 over 1957 was
related chiefly to the cut in price. In 1960 excursion fares
were created which wpre about 28% below the economy class fares
(the lowest normal fare). Group fares (for not less than 25
persons) were then introduced in 1962 and were 38 percent below
economy class fares. Furthermore, these were available most of
the year. In April 1964 the fare was again cut, 20 percent in
first class and 21% in economy class, except during ten weeks
TABLE 2.10
Transatlantic Passengers
To and From the U.S. on IATA Carriers
Scheduled P ssengers Percent GrowthYear
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
33.5 %
16.6
8.9
20.2
18.3
23.2
24.2
13.9
?7-4
7.8
19.8
9.3
28.5
16.2
14.4
17.1
6.0
14.5
Source: Mlonthly Reports of IATA.
286.7
382.8
446.3
486.2
584.5
691.6
851.9
1057.8
1204.4
1534.3
1654.3
1981.4
2165.0
2782.2
3233.4
3699.2
4333.5
4593.1
5260.7
in the summer when it was only 3%. On 1st January 1967 the
G.I.T. (Group Inclusive Tour) further reduced the fare to $230
and $280 for peak summer period.
The above mentioned fare reductions are generally
related to the normal fares. However, throughout the period
under discussion there have been many special fares, adapted
to certain categories of users. The big fare reductions brought
about by the introduction of a new class are probably those
which strike the public most, but it would be a mistake to
underestimate the influence of special fares, which have
certainly generated a constant and very substantial increase
in traffic. Examples of such fares are:
- Excursion fares, which presuppose a given length
of stay, sometimes with departures only on certain
days of the week. Often they are limited to
certain times of the year which are staggered
according to the point of origin of the passengers
(Europeans or Americans).
- Out-of-season fares, which also tend to lessen the
seasonal nature of traffic while permitting certain
categories of passengers to go on a transatlantic
trip at a lower price.
- Family fares.
- Group fares granted automatically to parties
comprising more than a certain number of members.
These special fares have been a useful addition to the
considerable fare reductions made in 1952 (tourist class) and in
1958 (economy class) and have stimulated a substantial expansion
in North Atlantic traffic.
At present there is a wide gap between first class
fare ($750) and charter fare ($190) on the North Atlantic. It
is expected that this differential ($560) will not increase
drastically due to the external forces of the regulatory body
and the public.
Tourist fares, initiated in 1952, produced a dilution
effect on the traffic. Figure 2.1 shows that the demand for
first class traffic declined sharply from 1952 and tourist class
traffic boomed. First class traffic did not pick up again until,
1954. In 1958 the introduction of economy fares again diluted
the traffic. This time, however, the switch was made from
tourist to economy and very little from first class to economy.
Excursion fares were created in 1960. At that time the dilution
of traffic involved all three classes of traffic but the effect
was more severe on the first class traffic as shown in Figure 2.1.
The net effect was an increase in the number of passengers and
total revenue. Although some passengers downgraded their class
of service, the lower fares expanded the market by making the
trip within the reach of the more price-conscious population.
The major reductions in air fare took place in 1952
and 1958. However, since 1958 and particularly since 1960
charter and package tours have extended the market and thereby
enabled people in lower income groups to participate. Charter
fares are lower than economy and even promotional fares offered
on scheduled service, and their rapid growth appears to be a
clear indication of theexpansionary impact of lower fares.
This section shows the impact of the charter flights, particularly
of supplemental carriers, on the traffic growth.
Historically, charter operations were started by
FIGURE 2.1
TRANSATLANTIC SCHEDULED AIR TRAFFIC-PASSENGERS
(000)
TOURIST/ECONOMY
1000
FIRST CLASS
* 
FIRST
100
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969
Source: Annual Reports of IATA
10000
scheduled airlines using spare (unproductive) equipment at
off-peak periods. However, advanced equipment, with higher
productivity (increased capacity and speed) and lower unit
operating costs brought about by high load factors made
charter operations profitable.
In recent years charter traffic across the North
Atlantic has been growing very rapidly relative to the traffic
on scheduled carriers. Table 2.11 gives the average growth
for charter and scheduled traffic from 1964 to 1969. The
supplemental charter traffic growth rates have been higher
than the IATA* charter growth. The proportion of the traffic
carried on total charter flights is shown in Table 2.12. As
before the percentage of traffic carried on charter flights has
been increasing, with supplemental charter traffic growing at
the expense of both scheduled air traffic as well as IATA charter
traffic.
Charter sales have increased as the price spread between
charters and schedulea services has increased. This gap in
fares (estimated over $160 average in 1968) from California to
Europe has been largely responsible for the growth of
supplemental charters in that market.
* IATA charter traffic refers to charter flights offered by the
scheduled carriers who are members of IATA. Supplemental
charter traffic refers to the carriers offering charter service
only. In the early sixties several carriers were authorized
to supplement the scheduled carriers by concentrating on
charters for bona fide groups. However, authorization was not
for these carriers to sell individually ticketed, point-to-
point, transportation to the general public.
TABLE 2.11
Transatlantic Air lMarket
Annual Percentage Growth Rates
Supplemental Charter
U.5, Foreign Total
18.2 73.9 31.5
Charter Scheduled Tot.1
Total Traffic Traffic
28.5 28.9
59.7 176.9 78.8 17.9
0.0 42.7 16.7
66.0 125.0 76.5 30.4
41*6 39.5 41.1 16.3
101.0 108.8 102.8 77.4
'14.4
17.1
6.0
14.5
14.7
19.0
7.6
24-8
Source: IATA, SARC, TWA
IATA
Charter
24.6
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
4.1
6.5
6.3
57.0
-5.2
44.7
TABLE 2.12
Transatlantic Passenger Traffic
Ntarket Shares
Charter vs. Scheduled Service
IATA Charter
Scheduled
86.9 %
86.6
8604
86.2
8409
83.6
76.7
IATA Supplemental
11.3 %
10.9
9.8
9.1
8.1
7.2
8.3
1.8 %
2.5
3.8
4.7
7.0
9.2
15.0
Source: IATA, SARC, TWA
Year
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Total
13*1
13.4
13.6
13.8
15.1
16.4
2303
The fact that supplementals can provide low-cost
transportation is not because of any high efficiency of operation
relative to scheduled carriers but because costs per passenger
are reduced if the load factor is very high. The supplemental
carriers can operate with extremely high load factors by
offering service on lucrative routes and during high seasons
only. Unlike the scheduled carriers, they are not obliged to
have regular service throughout the year on both high and low
density markets. For a New York-London round-trip, the cost
per passenger can range from $150 to $500 depending on whether
the load factor (B-707-145 seats) is 100 percent or only 30
percent. The higher the load factor, the lower the cost per
passenger. Table 2.13 shows the impact of load factor on
ticket price if each flight were priced to break-even on its
own, without averaging between flights.
Scheduled carriers have developed fare structures
which take into account operations throughout the year, high
load factors as well as low load factors, thin markets as well
dense markets. Supplemental carriers, however, offer fares
which are applicable to full plane loads or almost full plane
loads.
Table 2.12 shows the sharp upward trend of supplemental
penetration in recent years. In 1969 the supplementals accounted
for almost 15% of the total traffic across the North Atlantic.
In 1963 this percentage was less than two. Meanwhile IATA
charter share dropped from 11.3% to 8.3% in the same six year
period. It appears that the main reason for the tremendous growth
in supplemental carriers traffic is simply that these carriers
have misinterpreted their authorization and have carried traffic
other than bona fide groups.
TABLE 2.13
Hypothetical Transatlantic Fares
If Each Flight were Priced To Cover Its Own Operating Costs
London - Boston New York - Zurich
On-Board Trip Price
Day Passengers Per Passenger
On-board
Passengers
Trip Price
Per Passenger
Wonday
Tuesday
W ednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
77
68
69
88
47
138
93
$ 148
168
168
130
243
83
123
Source : Trans World Airlines
Week Ending October 19, 1969.
$ 320
444
362
281
336
197
417
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic exercise
a measure of control over the volume and nature of permitted
charter flights, both by their own and other countries'operators.
It appears that in the future regulatory action will be taken
to ensure that the total charter services be related in some
percentage manner to the scheduled service. In the long run
one can anticipate that the total charter capacity offered will
be restricted to about 20 percent of the total capacity
offered. This process has already started to take place.
Meetings are currently in progress between the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) member states, the United States
and Canadian authorities on the subject of non-scheduled
services.
Great Britain has imposed a 1971 summer quota of
90 inclusive tour charters for U.S. supplemental airlines,
although the carriers have already sold 118 such flights.
Germany has restricted the number to 30 for the entire year.
All U.S. supplemental flights originating on the eastern seaboard
have been banned from Belgium.
Charters, although a small percentage of the total
transatlantic market, are very important in several key markets.
They account for one-third of the transatlantic traffic
originating in California, and almost 85% of these charters are
on supplemental carriers. The price spread between charters and
scheduled service depends on the length of travel, the ratio of
ferry mileage to live mileage and the load factors.* In
1968, for example, this spread was about $70 for New York-London
round-trip and about $160 for Los Angeleb-Londoui round-trip.
*One reason for the negligible supplemental charter
activity on the North Atlantic during off-season is due to the
high ferry to live mileage ratio.
The impact of lower fares depends among other things
on the purpose of the trip. The pleasure traveler who uses
charter services, does so to save money and is, therefore,
willing to put up with a certain amount of inconvenience.
Many surveys have shown (TWA on-board surveys, PONYA) that the
two categories most attracted to charter travel are ethnic and
religious groups and educational and youth organizations.
Ethnic groups are often attracted to a particular destination
with which they feel they have emotional ties, often a desire
to visit the homeland. Their travel is generally for the
purpose of visiting friends or relatives. Price in this case
plays a very important role. The cost of the stay after
arriving at their destination is small. Similarly, students
are usually limited by cash, have a specific destination and the
cost of their stay is small relative to the cost of transportation.
Charters, therefore, are attracted to these groups because they
can generate full plane-loads through established organizations.
Charters are also attracted to professional and
cultural organizations. These include organizations from the
upper income sections of the community, for example, the
medical, legal, cultural organizations such as symphony and
art societies and political organizations. Charitable
organizations are also included in this group.
The previous discussion indicates that fares or cost
of transportation play a very important role in determining the
volume of traffic. This is evidenced by the result of many
surveys, one of which is quoted.here 1. This survey measured
the reaction of the air travelers to reduced fares. The main
conclusion reached was that people are highly sensitive to
trip costs. As Table 2.14 shows, only 12% of the people would
not, or probably would not, take more trips if fares were
reduced.
One question which should be raised is the cause
of declining fares when the price of almost everything else
has been going up. The answer can be seen in the continuous
reductions in the unit operating costs (both direct and indirect)
for the scheduled airlines due to the higher productivity of
the successive generations of civil aircraft. The jet aircraft
has considerably higher productivity being both bigger and
faster than the piston-engined aircraft. Although the new
aircraft also have higher operating costs per hour than their
predecessors, the gain in productivity per hour was greater than
their increase in costs per hour. Therefore the net effect
of their introduction was to produce a fall in the average unit
operating costs.
The average productivity of an aircraft is defined as
the product of the average block speed and the available payload.
This figure provides one measure by which various types of
aircraft can be measured. As for the ICAO states, for the
period 1951-1967, aircraft productivity increased at an average
9
annual growth rate of 10.7 percent . Aircraft productivity
was rising fairly fast (at about 7.5% per year) between 1951
and 1959, even before the introduction of the jets, due to
the steady introduction of the larger piston-engined aircraft.
As the larger and faster jets were introduced from 1960 onwards,
TABLE 2.14
Reaction to Reduced Fares and Free Plane Trips
By Experienced Air Travelers, 1962
(Percent of Distribution of Respondents)
Reaction Percentage of Travelers
If Plane Fare Were Half
would take more trips 44 %
probably would take more trips 3
might take more trips 4
If Plane travel Were Free
would take more trips 31 %
probably would take more trips 2
might take more trips 2
probably would not take more trips 2
would not take more trips 10
don't know, not ascertained 2
Total 100
Number of Respondents 884
Source: Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan
productivity increased steeply for four years (at about 18.5
percent per year) and then settled down to a steady increase
of about 9.5 percent per year as the transference to jets
continued at a (relatively) slower pace.
For the sqme time period,1951-1963 the average operating
costs only increased at an annual rate of 7.6 percent. The
aircraft operating costs per hour had been increasing steadily
between 1951 and 1959 and began to increase rapidly as jets
were introduced in the early 1960's.
These increases, however, were not as rapid as those
in aircraft productivity so that unit operating costs were
forced down at about 1 percent per year from 1951 to 1960 and
about 5 percent per year from 1960 to 1967. The net effect of
higher operating costs and even higher productivity was that
the average unit operating cost declined at an annual rate of
2.9 percent.
The increases in operating costs per aircraft hour
were chiefly due to the fact that it costs more to operate a
large aircraft than a small aircraft and more to operate a
fast aircraft than a slower aircraft, but not enough to
offset the increase in productivity. It is generally true
in most forms of transport that hourly costs tend to rise and
costs per unit of transport capacity tend to fall as the size
of the vehicle is increased. In the case of the jets, the
increases in costs per hour were kept down by the greater
technical efficiency of the jet engine and the lower cost of its
fuel, so that costs per ton-mile of capacity produced fell more
than they would have done otherwise.
The other cost related factor is, of course, inflation,
which had the effect of increasing prices and reducing the value
of money by an average of 2% per year throughout the world.
The main effect of this inflationary trend on airline operating
costs was not so much that it increased the price of things
the airlines had to buy, since some of their main purchases
were cheaper in 1967 than in 1951 (jet fuel was cheaper than
fuel for the piston engines and initial prices of the jet
aircraft themselves were less in relation to equivalent
productive capacity) but that they had to absorb rapid
increases in the wages and salaries of airline personnel.
United States Air Transport Association has reported that the
average salaries paid by the U.S. domestic airlines increased
60 percent over the decade from 1957 to 1967. ICAO reported9,
from statistics provided by some of the foreign carriers,
that in general wages and salaries increased from 1957 to 1967
by between 50 to 100 percent in most parts of the world.
Table 2.15 gives the distribution of operating costs by
category.
Figures 2.2. and 2.3 show two examples of the
historical trend of unit airline cost and revenue, the Atlantic
Division of Pan American Airways (Figure 2.2) and Trans
World Airlines (Figure 2.3). The difference in cost and
revenue data in the two charts is basically due to variation
in route structure, aircraft fleet and on-line traffic mix.
The term revenue applies to total transport revenue, passenger
as well as cargq carried on passenger aircraft. Total transport
revenue was selected rather than passenger revenue alone
because expenses (costs) are usually published for total
operations and because of the difficulty in accurately
T ABLE 2.15
Operating Costs
(Scheduled Airlines of ICAO States)
1957
Cost* % of total
. 1967
Cost* % of total
General and Administrative 1.3
Ticketing Sales 3.3
Passenger Service 1.7
Station and Ground 3.5.
Flight Equipment Depreciation 2.1
Maintenance 4.5
Flight Operations 7.2
Total
Cost* = U.S. Cents Per Ton-km Available
Source: ICAO Circular 89-AT/15. Ref.9
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allocating part of the costs of cargo carried on passenger
aircraft. It is clear from the charts that the unit operating
costs have been declining in the last twenty years due to .
the higher productivity of newer aircraft. Reduction in unit
costs have been followed fairly closely by reduction in fares.
Table 2.16 shows the historical trend of the various
cost components. It is clear that the greatest cost savings
have been realized in the cost component 'flying operations'.
Table 2.15 also shows that not only is this category the largest
single cost item, but also that from 1957 to 1967, it decreased
from 30 percent to 26 percent of the total costs.
It seems probable that the rate of increase in
operating costs per hour will continue to increase less than
aircraft productivity. In the case of the SST's, the hourly
costs are expected to rise more than productivity, particularly
in the case of the first generation, but this will be more than
offset by the effect of the B-747 and various types of
"airbuses" whose volume of operations will probably be greater
than those of the SST's at least until 1980. Reductions in
transatlantic fares brought about by advanced technology, are
discussed in detail in Appendix A.
2.2.2 Trip Time
The decision to go by air is mainly a function of
trip time. Speed is the primary competitive advantage of air
travel over sea travel, for the transatlantic journey has
become both shorter and more reliable with speed improvements
in newer aircraft.
TABLE 2.16
Operating Expenses per Available Ton-Mile (cents)
Pan American - Atlantic Division
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
C;' 1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Note.
Flying Maintenance Depreciation Passenger
Operations Flying Equip. Flying Equip. Service
16.2 na 6.2 na
14.9 na 5.0 na
13.7 na 4.5 na
12.7 na 3.8 na
12.7 na 3.4 na
11.8 na 3.5 na
12.2 5.7 4.2 3.0
11.6 5.8 3.9 3.0
10.1 6.1 4.2 3.3
8.7 5.0 3.6 2.8
7.4 4.3 3.4 2.3
6.5 3.9 2.6 2.1
6.0 3.6 2.5 2.1
5.9 4.0 2.0 2.2
5.3 3.3 1.7 2.2
5.2 3-2 1.6 2.4
5.0 3.0 1.7 2.4
5.0 3.0 1.7 2.2
5.4 2.9 1.6 2.4
Maintenance includes flight equipment and ground equ
A/C & TFC
Service
na
na
na
na
na
na
5.2
5.5
5.6
5.3
4.4
3.9
3.7
4.0
3.8
4.1
3.9
3.8
4.0
Promotion General and
and Sales Administrative
na na
na na
na na
na na
na na
na na
6.2 1.6
6.1 1.6
6.9 1.7
5.7 1.2
4.4 1.1
4.0 1.0
4.0 0.9
4.0 1.0
3.8 1.1
3.9 1.0
3.5 0.9
3.4 0.9
3.5 1.0
ipment, both direct and indirect.
Source: Ref. 10
PAA's 1939 flying-boat service (B314-cruising speed
of 145 m.p.h.) from New York to Lisbon theoretically took
about 25 1/2 hours. Headwinds sometimes seriously affected
such slow aircraft and made it necessary to refuel in the
Azores if there was a headwind. Due to the adverse weather
conditions the route was impracticable in winter. For
example, only 56% of the flights were completed in the winter
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of 1939-40 . As regular flights on the Northern route began
in 1945, DC-4's required 20 hours eastbound and at least
27 hours westbound against prevailing winds between New York
and London stopping three or four times enroute. By 1955,
stretched and improved models of the Douglas and Lockheed
series reduced the travel times on New York-London route to
about 21 hours eastbound and about 17 hours westbound. The
DC-7C in 1956, although slower than earlier Douglas piston
aircraft, flew non-stop in both directions on the New York-London
route.
The intercontinental jets have now reduced travel
times to about 6 1/2 hours eastbound and 7 1/2 hours westbound.
The improvements in aircraft cruising speeds have been reflected
almost completely in decreased travel times from about 25 1/2
hours to an average of just over 7 hours. Table 2.17 gives
the cruising speeds of representative aircraft in the past.
TABLE 2.17
Representative Aircraft Speeds
Year Aircraft Speed (MPH)
1926 Fokker Trimotor 90
1936 DC-3 170
1946 L-1049 270
1953 DC-7 330
1958 B-707 550
Source: Ref. 12
The increases in non-stop range of aircraft have also
led to shorter point-to-point travel times through the
elimination of intermediate stops. A longer-range capability
was not necessarily combined with higher cruising speed in
newer aircraft. The DC-7C is an example in which range was
increased making it the first airliner capable of non-stop
transatlantic operation in either direction while cruising
speed was actually slightly decreased (around 310 M.P.H. compared
with about 330 M.P.H. for the DC-7, which preceded it by three
years in service).
Reduction in trip time, basically due to the higher
speeds of aircraft, has affected both the business traveler
as well as the pleasure traveler. Higher speeds have meant
that the businessman can reach his destination in less time.
Higher speeds also mean that the pleasure traveler can visit
more distant places in a given time.
The supersonic transport will not only reduce the
total trip time across the North Atlantic but it could make a
one-day trip possible between city-pairs which presently
require an overnight stay. For example, on a New York-Paris
trip, the U.S. Boeing-2707 is expected to complete the trip
in about 2 hours and 40 minutes. This includes time for
take-off, landing and subsonic cruise to and from supersonic
flight points. A passenger can leave New York at 7:00 AM
arriving in Paris at 3:00 PM local time. On the return journey
he could leave Paris at 9:00 PM local time and be in New York
the same evening at 7:00 PM. It is difficult to predict the
stimulation in travel demand due to the possibility of a
"one-day" return trip. An attempt was made to investigate the
travel demand between Chicago and Los Angeles before and
after the introduction of subsonic jets to see if the "same-day"
return travelers could be identified. Lack of adequate data
proved this to be an impossibility.
The introduction of the subsonic jet demonstrated that
increased speed generated increased travel. In theory the SST's
projected reduction in travel time should be at least equally
effective.
The total demand for air travel (pleasure and business)
varies inversely with the time required to complete a given
trip. The value placed upon travel time for both pleasure and
business purposes would presumably be related to some measure
of the traveler's earning rate. One such measure is the wage
rate. There are, of course, many reasons why the value of time
spent in travel might be larger or smaller than the traveler's
wage rate. To the extent that the business traveler works
during part of the flight or the pleasure traveler reads or
watches a movie, travel does not take time away from other
activities that have value. In addition, traveling might
-be sufficiently relaxing, exciting or prestigious to the extent
that travelers would pay for these pleasures by placing a lower
rate on their value of time. Conversely, those for whom travel
is boring, fatiguing or frightening would value travel time
at rates higher than otherwise. Thus, although it is
reasonable to expect that the higher the traveler's earnings,
the higher the value he would place upon his time, the exact
value he places upon his time might actually be either greater
7than or less than his earning rate
2.2.3 Comfort, Safety, Convenience
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
determine the exact effect of comfort, safety and convenience
on the volume of traffic. The difficulty lies in the fact that
these variables are difficult to quantify and that their relative
numerical value is rather subjective. Nevertheless, they do
affect travel demand even if the contribution may be small. It
has been suggested that changes in these variables such as
comfort and convenience tend to occur more or less evenly over
time. It is assumed in this study that while each of these
variables may be quite difficult to measure empirically, the
net effect of all these factors may be approximated by a time
trend function.
Comfort
Comfort is related to the comfort in the aircraft
as well as comfort at the airport. With respect to comfort
in the aircraft, there have been gradual product improvements
related to the transatlantic trip. The newer aircrafts have
gradually improved the quality of the air service. Major
innovations which have led to greater comfort are the
pressurized cabins and the reduction in cabin noise and vibration
on the B-307 "stratoliner" in 1940. The early post-war L-049
"constellation" allowed a cabin altitude of 8000 feet flying
at 20000 feet. The DC-7C, at the same altitute, dropped the
cabin pressure equivalent to 500 feet and the jets have cabin
pressurized to 3500 feet at 30,000 feet and about 6500 feet at
13
40000 feetl. The improvement in the cabin noise level has
been less significant. The B-707 is just as noisy as the L-049.
However, the jets produce less vibration than the piston-engine
aircraft.
Although the type of meal provided on international
flights is regulated by IATA to prevent competition taking this
form, the quality of food service has improved significantly.
Other factors contributing to inflight comfort have been
items such as special meals, vast quantities and variety of
reading material, inflight stereo multi-channel music and
movies.
The level of inflight comfort has also been increased
due to lower values of seating density, the classical example
being the B-747. The distance between seats and their individual
width vary with the type of service which the passenger buys.
The comfort level at the airport has also been
steadily improving. Modern facilities at the airports, easy
and comfortable access to the aircraft (covered ramps, mobile
lounges) have increased the level of comfort.
Access times to and egress times from the airports
have generally increased around some larger cities. This is
partly due to the movements of the airports to locations more
distant from the city centres but mostly due to the increasing
traffic congestion on the roads.
Safety
It is true that a certain percentage of the
traveling public will always be diverted to other modes for
safety reasons. For this group, fear plays a large role in
keeping them away from the airlines. This remains true even
though the relative improvement in the safety of airline
service, according to the measures usually presented, has been
greater than for major surface transport media. For example,
the passenger fatality rate has been constantly declining.
Of course, the absolute number of passenger deaths due to
aircraft accidents has been growing but the number of
passengers has been increasing more rapidly.
Convenience
Factors contributing to greater convenience have been
excess capacity, an increased number of flights in any given
market, increasing number of origins and destinations, more and
more direct flights, city-centre baggage check-in locations,
etc. Excess capacity implies that the passengers are not
forced to plan their trips well in advance. This is especially
important to the business traveler whose plans cannot be
confirmed too far ahead of his departure.
Increased frequency reduces the waiting time at the
terminals and provides greater flexibility in making connections.
A greater number of origins and destinations also implies a
reduction in connecting time and, hence, a reduction in the
total trip time. Direct flights also have the same effect.
The success of non-stop flights from the U.S. West Coast to
Europe have shown the convenience of direct flights. Where
a traffic market does not justify direct flights, the carriers
have offered through-plane service. For example, Cleveland-
New York-London, Los Angeles-London-Paris and Detroit-Boston-
London are specific instances of through-plane service. In
these cases stop-over times are lower than connecting times
and passengers are assured of being on the plane and not
missing a connection.
City-centre check-in locations save the passenger
carrying his baggage to the airport and thus avoid lengthy
check-in queues at the airport. It also reduces his pre-flight
check-in time at the origin. The net effect of all these
factors is to increase passenger convenience and to reduce
the total trip time.
CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL DATA FOR MODEL CALIBRATION
This chapter describes the sources of historical data and
its limitations. The chapter is divided into three sections. The
first section describes sources of data on the dependent variable
"traffic". The next two sections describe the data sources for
the independent variables: socio-economic (Section 3.2) and
transport related (Section 3.3). Projections of this data are
described in the forecasts, Chapter V.
Table 3.1 gives a summary of the calibration data for both
the dependent and the independent variables. The statistical data
used in this study was derived from the annual reports of IATA,
INS, ICAO and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Other library
sources include analytical studies, reports and articles published
in the U.S. and in Europe regarding economic, demographic,
political and technological factors which influence the demand
for overseas travel.
It is necessary to point out that something which occurred
in the past is not necessarily a completely known quantity. This
applies in particular to the macroeconomic variables which were
discussed in Chapter II and are tabulated in the present section.
None of these variables can directly be observed in a way in
which they can be verified. To find the value which such a vari-
able takes in a certain year it is necessary to add numerous
figures from various files, to divide by (deflation), and so on.
For this reason the basic data will generally be incomplete in
the first few months after a certain year, and therefore, the
first preliminary estimate will frequently be subject to rather
sizeable observational errors. The preliminary estimates are
TABLE 3.1
Summary of Historical Data for Model Calibration
Composite
Year GNP($B) INC./CAP.
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
$234
271
290
253
294
336
329
336
356
366
369
394
422
428
463
494
502
528
548
$1124
1286
1367
1260
1375
1538
1572
1621
1680
1742
1795
1887
1986
2079
2236
2397
2515
2715
2938
Speed
Fare MPH
$594
580
548
544
533
526
519
521
515
515
472
445
448
404
397
380
368
363
352
285
285
290
305
330
330
340
340
340
380
420
460
505
550
590
590
590
590
590
Traffic
Time (OQO)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
1007
1240
1353
1455
1582
1762
1969
2144
2222
2612
2699
3096
3777
4023
4519
5040
5773
6057
7438
followed by revised estimates, which are based on less imperfect
data, and so on, until the time when it is not considered worth-
while to continue the process of revision. This does not mean,
of course, that the "final" or "definitive" data are perfect in
the sense of having zero observational errors.
3.1 Traffic Data - Dependent Variable
The time-series traffic data (Table 3.2) was taken from the
annual IATA reports. The cross-sectional data was taken from the
annual reports of INS. Since they exclude the passenger traffic
of Icelandic Airlines, the only non-IATA carrier with scheduled
service across the North Atlantic, the statisticsof the IATA
are not complete. Furthermore, the IATA statistics exclude
passengers carried on non-scheduled flights by non-member carriers
and military transport aircraft.
The INS publishes statistics on passengers arriving in and
departing from the U.S., by air and sea, by country of origin or
destination. Again, this data is incomplete because several types
of passengers are not included. For example, U.S. military per-
sonnel using commercial and military transports are not included
although civilians on military transport planes are counted.
Despite these deficiencies, the statistics published by the INS
are the best available, and these were used to analyze the cross
-sectional data in the development of the travel demand between
the U.S. and Europe.
3.2 Socio-Economic Data - Independent Variables
The Gross National Product of the specific European
countries used in this study (Table 3.3) was obtained from a
History of Transatlantic Traffic
(000)
Charter
- Supplemental Scheduled
Year IATA U.S. F.F Total Total Traffic
91 LU5. - - - 10.5 286. /
1952 13.4 - - - 13.4 382.8
1953 14.4 - - - 14.4 446.3
1954 26.2 - - - 26.2 486.2
1955 35.9 - - - 35.9 584.5
1956 45.8 - - + - 45.8 691.6
1957 48.5 21.5 4.3+ 25.8 74.3 851.9
1958 70.2 27.4 5.5 32.9 103.1 1057.8
1959 78.4 27.8# 5.6+ 33.4 111.8 1204.4
1960 136.2 25.6# 5.0+ 30.6 166.8 1534.3
1961 162.2 42.8 8.6 51.4 213.6 1654.3
1962 158.8 56.1 10.0+ 66.1 224.9 1981.4
1963 281.5 35.0 11.0 46.0 327.5 2165.0
1964 350.8 67.0 13.0 80.0 430.8 2782.2
1965 365.1 107.0 36.0 143.0 508.1 3233.4 1
1966 389.0 168.0 36.0 204.0 593.0 3699.2 1
1967 413.4 279.0 81.0 360.0 773.4 4333.5 1
1968 391.8 395.0113.0 508.0 899.8 4593.1 1
1969 567.0 794.0236.0 1030.0 1597.0 5260.7
* This is U.S. traffic.only. Canadian traffic is excluded.
Icelandic
Traffic
4.4
8.6
13.1
15.7
19.5
24.8
32.1
36.3
69.2
74.6
94.6
28.6
44.4
62.4
64.1
# Traffic for these years was estimated. The statistics were given for
30th September for each year. These numbers were increased by 15 %
the period 1st April
to obtain the annual
+ Traffic for these years was estimated and taken to be equal to 20 % of the U.S. Supplemental traffic.
TABLE 3.2
1
0
Total
Air
Traffic
297.2
396.2
460.7
516.8
620.4
750.5
941.9
1080.4
1341.0
1733.2
1914.2
2275.5
2567.1
3307.6
3870.1
4436.6
5269.3
5657.0
Sea
Traffic
710
844
892
938
962
1011
1027
964
881
879
785
820
810
715
649
603
504
400
Grand
Total
1007.2
1240.2
1352.7
1454.8
1582.4
1761.5
1968.9
2144.4
2222.0
2612.2
2699.2
3095.5
3777.1
4022.6
4519.1
5039.6
5773.3
6057.0
through
traffic.
TABLE 3.3
History of Gross National Product of Europe
in 1966 Prices
Percent
Growth
3.1
5.1
5.2
6.1
4.5
4.1
2.0
4.8
6.7
5.3
4.4
4.5
6.0
4.2
1.8
Population
279.6
281.3
283.2
285.3
287.3 
-
289.5
291.8
294.2
296.7
299.1
301.9
305.3
308.4
311.4
314.4
317.1
Percent
Growth
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
G.N.P./
Capita
965
989
1032
1078
1136
1178
1217
1231
1279
1352
1411
1457
1506
1582
1633
1646
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Average
1951-1966
Growth
* Billions
# Millions
Source: Ref. 3 and 16
G.N.P.'
1966 $
269.8
278.2
292.3
307.6
326.3
341.0
355.0
362.2
379.5
404.4
425.9
444.8
464.6
492.7
513.4
522.0
0.8 %
Percent
Growth
2.5
4.3
4.5
5.4
3.7
3.3
1.2
3.9
5.7
4.4
3.3
3.4
5.0
3.2
0.8
3.0 %4.5 %
report of the Agency for International Development. The
United Nations reference books provided the source for the
population statistics. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 give the corresponding
economic data for the United States. Gross National
Product of the U.S. was obtained from ref. 14 in current
dollars. The same reference also published the Consumer Price
Index (C.P.I.), thus enabling the GNP to be determined in 1966
constant dollars. Gross National Product of the individual
European countries considered is given in Appendix B,
Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3. In order to calculate the composite
GNP as described in Chapter IV, one needs the traffic breakdown,
that is, the percentage of traffic deriving from each of the
European countries and Europe compared to the United States.
Tables B.4, B.5 and B.6 show this breakdown for European traffic
and B.7, B.8 and B.9 for the U.S. traffic. Using the GNP
(Tables B.4 through B.6) together with the methodology developed
in Chapter IV, the Composite GNP of Europe was constructed.
The results of this are shown in Table B.10 and B.11.
Appendix B, Tables B.12 through B.14, give the
National Income for European countries in each country's national
currency. These figures were converted into equivalent U.S.
dollars using the official exchange rate of the time, which is
given in reference 15. The National Income in U.S. dollars
was then divided by the population to determine per capita
income. These are shown in Tables B.15 and B.16. To determine
the composite national income per capita, the procedure was
repeated as in the case of GNP above and as outlined in
Chapter IV. The results are shown in B.17 and B.18.
TABLE 3.4
History of Gross National Product of the U.S.
Current and Constant Dollars
Percent C.P.I.
Growth 1957-59*100
90.5
5.2
5.5
0.1
9.1
5.3
5.2
1.4
8.1
4.1
3.3
7.7
5.4
7.1
8.3
9.5
5.8
9.1
7.7
6.0 %
92.5
93.2
93.6
93.3
94.7
98.4
100.7
101.5
103.1
104.2
105.4
106.7
108.1
109.9
113.1
116.3
121.2
127.7
2.0 %
C.P.I. G.N.P.
1966-100 1966 $
80.0
81.8
82.4
82.8
82.5
83.7
87.0
89.0
89. 7
91.2
92.1
93.2
94.3
95.6
97.2
100.0
102.8
107.2
112.9
2.0 %
410.5
422.4
442.5
440.6
482.4
500.8
507.0
502.6
539.2
552.3
564.7
6o.2
626.2
661.5
704.6
749.9
771.9
807.6
825.8
* Billions
P=Preliminary
Source: Ref. 14-pages 177 and 229
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
G.N.P.*
Current $
328.4
345.5
364.6
364.8
398.0
419.2
441-1
447.3
483.7
503.7
520.1
560.3
590.5
632.4
684.9
749.9
793.5
865.7
932.5
Percent
Growth
2.9
4.8
-0,4
9.5
3.8
1.2
-0.9
7.3
2.4
2.2
6.5
4.2
5.6
6.5
6.4
2.9
4.6
2.3
Average
1951-1969
Growth
4.0 %
TABLE 3.5
U.S. Gross National Product Per Capita
In 1966 Prices
G.N.P.
(Billions)
410-5
422.4
442.5
440.6
482.4
500.8
507.0
502.6
539.2
552.3
564.7
601.2
626.2
661.5
704.6
749.9
771.9
807.6
825.8
Population
(Millions)
154-9
157.6
160.2
163.0
165.9
168.9
172.0
174.9
177.8
180.7
183.8
186.7
189.4
192.1
194.6
196.9
199.1
201.2
203.6
Percent
Growth
1,7
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.7
1.3
1-7
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
101
101
1.2
G.N.P.
Per Capita-
2650
2680
2762
2703
2908
2965
2948
2874
3033
3056
3072
3220
3306
3444
3621
3809
3877
4014
4056
1.5 %
14-page 177 and Ref. 17
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Percent
Growth
1.1
3.1
-2.1
7.6
2.0
-o.6
-2.5
5.5
0.8
0.5
4.8
2.7
4.2
5.1
5.2
1.8
305
1.0
Average
1951-1969
Growth
Source: Ref.
3.3 Transport Related Independent Variables
Typical fare values of given time periods were discussed
in Chapter II. Typical cost of transportation was taken to be
the average New York-London fare calculated by using typical
Atlantic yields and length of haul. The figures and calculations
are shown in Chapter II, Table 2.9.
Typical aircraft cruising speeds were taken for the
Lockheed series of aircraft and later the Boeing jets. Table 3.1
shows the historical average speed of aircraft on the North
Atlantic. Figure 3.1 shows the historical introduction of high
speed aircraft on the North Atlantic. The dotted curve represents
an estimate of the average speed of the aircraft for the industry.
The average aircraft cruise speed for a given fleet is lower
during the period of introduction of faster aircraft. This is due
to the "phasing in" of new aircraft, when there are both slower
and faster aircraft in service simultaneously. Figure 3.1 also
shows an estimate of this speed trend during the supersonic
transport age. This part of the trend is discussed further in
Chapter V.
Figure 3.1
Historical and Expected Introduction of High Speed Aircraft
on the North Atlantic
Top Aircraft Speed in a Given Year
Average Aircraft Speed for the Industry
on the North Atlantic
1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978
Source: Ref. 10
YEAR OF INTRODUCTION
1982 1986
w4
-J
W-
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CHAPTER IV
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION
This chapter presents the results of several regression
analyses using the data and assumptions outlined in the next
chapter. It was stated in the introduction that the forecasts
of the air travel demand are derived by means of an econometric
macromodel. The purpose of the present chapter is to consider
this procedure in some detail by, first, showing what these
models look like and, secondly, by presenting the calibration
results and the predictive accuracy of the models.
The choice of the independent variables of the models is
restricted to Gross National Product and National Income, which
represent the'socio-economic factors, and average fare and speed,
representing the transport variables. As described in Chapter
II, the selection of the variables is limited due to the avail-
ability of data and the difficulty of quantification. A sto-
chastic term is included to account for the remaining variables
described in Chapter II but which are excluded in the models
shown here.
4.1 General Structure of Econometric Models
The total travel demand on the North Atlantic is related
to a number of systematic variables such as those discussed in
Chapter II and a stochastic variable. Normally, the right-hand
side of a demand equation would contain an impractically large
number of predictor variables. In this case, however, it was
decided to represent demand as an explicit function of a small
number of systematic variables which are presumably more impor-
tant and let the net effect of the excluded variables be repre-
sented by a stochastic variable. This variable accounts for all
forces which should be included explicitly in the behavioural
demand equation but are unquantifiable or subjective. Variation
of these forces is, therefore, allowed through the use of a time
trend function. The assumption here is that the effect of the
stochastic variable is similar to that observed in the past and,
furthermore, on the long-term basis, this time function will
satisfactorily account for many of the secondary variables.
A multiplicative type of extrinsic model has been formu-
lated, justified by the historical traffic across the North At-
lantic which appears curvilinear when plotted on an arithmetic
grid. Furthermore, a straight multiplicative type of model was
preferred over a difference (first difference and percentage
difference) type, since the latter is normally used for short-
term forecasting. An attempt was made to incorporate the delays
with which the socio-economic factors exert their influence on
the volume of traffic. For example, the family income in year t
may affect the North Atlantic travel demand in year t, (t-1), or
(t+1).
In general, the mathematical formulation of these models
can be represented by Equations 4.1 and 4.2.
T..(t) = K-X (t±6,)-X (tie2)......f(t) ----- Eq.4.1
13 l-7 2 ---
Log T.. (t) = log K
+ o(log X 7 (t± e1)
:lJ
+ 3 log X2- (ti 62)
ij
+ log f(t) --- Eq.4.2
where:
T.. (t) = total traffic between i (U.S.) and j (Europe)
in period t.
K = constant
x. = i th variable
6. = lag or lead for the i th variable
ij = value of variable between i and j (e.g., fare) or
weighted average value of the variable (e.g,,
weighted GNP of U.S. and Europe)
f(t) = function of time period.
The exponents in the model represent partial elasticities,
one elasticity coefficient for each factor which may be regarded
as an average elasticity over the range of data. The implicit
assumption here is that the partial elasticities are constant
and will not change during the forecast period. The general form
of the model does not contain terms which represent cross-elas-
ticity. This is to say that first class traffic is not separated
from the economy or excursion traffic, and business travel demand
is not separated from the pleasure travel demand. This is due
to the substantial limitations of the data available to reflect
the price upon which the traveler makes his decision and the lack
of techniques to secure homogeneity so that the price and income
effects may be isolated.
4.2 Model Development
It is emphasized that even though a more complex model may
be required to attain the degree of accuracy desired, its con-
struction may be deterred by the limited availability and degree
of quantification of the data. In the models presented here,
the explanatory variables were reduced to a minimum for three
reasons:
1. If accuracy can be obtained using a few explanatory
variables, then introduction of a larger number of
explanatory variables would produce the unnecessary
and complicated task of predicting their future values
for forecasting traffic.
2. Many of the so-called "independent" variables are
interrelated and thus produce statistical difficulties
such as multicollinearity.
3. Because the length of the base period is limited
(19 data points), it is desirable to reduce the num-
ber of variables in the estimating equation to a min-
imum in order to keep the number of degrees of free-
dom relatively high.
The first model (represented in Equation 4.3) was con-
structed using five explanatory variables. For simplicity the
time lag is set at one year and is restricted to the variables
Gross National Product and National Income. Population growth
was introduced in the equation by expressing the socio-economic
variables in per capita form. Its direct influence is, there-
fore, incorporated in the time trend function. Other factors,
such as those discussed in Chapter II are also important. Al-
though individually each of these may be of a secondary nature,
together they do offer valuable information regarding the over-
all traffic trend, and, therefore, are included in the model by
the time trend.
The time trend represents a natural growth function which
resembles a compound interest type of formulation. The model
thus depicts the idea that traffic grows at a certain constant
rate due to changes in the secondary variables such as those
mentioned earlier. This growth rate is then superimposed by
variation in the systematic variables thus producing a variation
in the total growth rate around this "natural growth." Figure
4.1 shows this in the graphic form.
T .(t) = A-G OC(t-l)-DA (t-l) -F . , (t) -V -f(t) - (l+g) t--Eq. 4. 313 13 c
T. .(t) = Total traffic between i(U.S.) and j(Europe)
in period (t).
T = A ++ S
AIR SEA
AIRT T T. + +ARA L.s 1.c n.1. s
T. = IATA scheduled traffic
1.S
T. = IATA charter traffic1.c
T . = NON-IATA traffic
n.1
T = supplemental charter trafficS
Y_ = Total sea traffic
SEA
G(t-l) = composite GNP in period (t-1)
G = f n(G G)
gl u.s e
Figure 4.1
Actual
Traffic
"Natural" Growth
With Time
External Forces Such as
Changes in Income, Fare, etc.
Time
Illustration
of the Variation in Travel Growth
G_ =-GNP of United States
U.S
G = GNP of Europe
n
G = f (G n.......... G ) where n...m are the
e n m
individual countries to be considered in "Europe".
D (t-1) = composite national income/capita in period (t-1)
-n
D f (D , D)dl u.s e
D U.S= national income/capita of the U.S.
= national income/capita of Europe
D n
e d2
(D . . . . . . . . . .D )
n m
F(t) average cost of transportation from i to j
V (t) = average cruise speed of aircraft in operation
on the North Atlantic at time t
(1 + g) t= function of time trend ..... .a natural growth
term. This implies that if GNP, Income, Fares
and speed of aircraft were constant, the traffic
would grow at "g" percent due to all other
factors such as population, improvement in
service and effect of variation in tastes.
t= 1,2,3 ...... ,35. (Year 1951=1, 1985=35)
Having defined the model in general terms, the functions
should be defined explicitly. The composite GNP and National
Income per capita functions are obtained by using a unique
weighting system. The desired weighting system is the one which
represents, on a relative basis, the ability and desire of each
country's population to take a transatlantic trip. In this
study each country's GNP and National Income per capita. in year
t was weighted by the percentage of total transatlantic passen-
gers generated by that country in year t. At this point the
input to the model interrelates cross-sectional traffic data to
the time-series economic data.
G (t) = G (t) - i (t) +. ........ + G (t) i (t)e n n m m
where i (t) is the percentage of round trip
transatlantic European traffic accounted by the
nationals of country n in the year (t).
G(t) = Gu~ u - s (t) + G (t) - Metu .S u's e e
Where i and i are the percentages of total
u.s e
transatlantic (European and U.S. citizens) traf-
fic accounted by the U.S. citizens and Europeans
respectively in the year t.
Similarly,
De(t) = n(t) i (t) +........ + D (t) m 
D(t) =D US(t) -i US(t) + D (t) - i e(t)u.s u.s e e
The term "fare" represents the cost of transportation.
A typical cost of a transatlantic trip (New York-London) is
shown in Table 2.9 for air travel only. Furthermore, this
table indicates the average price paid by all passengers. No
attempt was made to weight air and sea fares. It was possible
to obtain the annual yield data for air traffic, which takes
into account all classes of fare, that is, charter rates as well
as fares paid on scheduled services. Similar yield data for the
sea fares was not available.
The justification offered for using the average air fare
only is as follows. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show that the air fare
and the sea fare trends are very similar. Secondly, the passen-
gers who now travel by sea do so for reasons other than cost.
It may be the sheer pleasure and relaxation of spending five
days on the sea or the fear of flying. In either case the modal
choice is not dependent on the cost of the trip.
The other simplification incorporated in the fare index
is the assumption that the New York-London fare trend is a fair
representation for the whole North Atlantic. Again this can
be justified on the basis that almost all fares are "pegged" to
this route, as has been historically true in the case of IATA
members operating on the North Atlantic. Occasionally a new
fare would be introduced on a particular route, for example,
New York-Rome. In this case the New York-London and almost all
other fares would be changed accordingly.
Model 1
The first model, shown by Equation 4.3, was calibrated
using the historical data from 1951 through 1969. The calibra-
tion of the models, that is, the estimation of the coefficients,
was performed by employing regression analysis. Appendix C
gives a brief outline of the computer program used to determine
the regression coefficients.
Table 4.1 shows the results of the regression analysis.
The next step is the determination of the adequacy of the esti-
mated coefficients. The estimated values of these coefficients
are by nature averages or means. If we plot the "estimated"
value of traffic T (using Equation 4.3 with coefficients as in
Table 4.1), it is quite possible that no one value of traffic
T will equal exactly the "actual" value of traffic T. This im-
plies the possibility that no one point in the scatter diagram
(actual versus estimated) lies exactly on the curve, but the
values of estimated T may be close to actual T. Since errors
are to be expected in all such estimations, it is necessary to
measure the amount of error and infer from this the degree of
confidence that can be attributed to the estimated coefficients.
The standard error of the regression coefficients is one
such statistic to test the adequacy of the estimated coeffi-
cients. If the "errors" (difference between actual traffic
and traffic estimated using the regression equation) in the ana-
lytical model are random, independent, and normally distributed,
then the principles of statistical estimation show that the quan-
tity "t" follows the t-distribution with (N-N ) degrees of free-
c
dom for each estimated coefficient , , f, Y , etc. For example,
for the coefficient oc, partial elasticity with respect to GNP
per capita, t is determined from the expression:
t = ----- 
Eq.4.4
where:
t = Students' distribution
C= estimated regression coefficient
TABLE 4.1
Empirical Results - Model 1.
Estimated
Coefficient
logK(constant)-4.6776
P (GNP) - 0.7749
/ (income) 1.4475
3 (Fare) 0.3658
4'(Speed) 0.6021
log(1+g) 0.0507
(Time)
Standard
Error
6.9148
0.0000
0.6664
0.5263
0.3046
0.0168
t-
statistic
- 0.6765
- 1.6144
2.1719
0.6950
1.9764
3.0153
Confidence
Limits *
-16.998
- 1.630
+ 0.260
- 0.571
- 1.146
+ 0.021
+7.642
+0.080
+2.634
+1.303
+0.058
+0.081
F-Statistic (5,12)
Durbin-Watson Statistic - d
Sum of Squared Residuals
* Ten Percent Level of Significance
= 0.9967
- 725.563
= 2.4709
= 0.0174543
O< = hypothetical coefficient, if there were no errors
present in the estimating Equation 4.3
.,= standard error of the regression coefficient
N = sample data points
N = number of independent variables
The statistic t (as shown in Table 4.1) is a measure of
the difference between the empirical coefficient and the hypo-
thetical coefficient, taking account of the sampling variabili-
ty. It is useful for establishing confidence limits and tests
of significance.2 0
The usual procedure is to execute a test of signifi-
cance, that is, to test the statistical significance of each of
the empirical coefficients,oc,,4, Y, etc. For example, if there
is no relationship between traffic T and income D in the sample
data, than P = 0. The hypothesis to be tested is thatA = 0,
and a confidence level is chosen. If we reject this hypothesis,
we conclude that the empirical coefficient is statistically
different from zero. If, on the other hand, we accept this
hypothesis, then 1 is not significant and there is probably no
relation between traffic T and income D in the sample data.
The empirical values of statistic t are shown in Table
4.1 forall five regression coefficients and the constant term.
Next, the hypothesis that the coefficients D(,,3, etc., are zero
at 10 percent level of significance and for 12 degrees of free-
dom is tested. Students' t-distribution tables (Ref. 21, p.226)
suggest that we may expect a positive or negative value of t
that may be as large as 1.782, if the hypothesis were true.
That is, if the regression coefficients are in fact zero, we
may expect a difference between zero and the empirical values
4, # , etc., which is the result of chance or sampling errors.
This difference, however, can not be so great as to lead to a
value of t that exceeds t 1.782. In our case, Table 4.1 shows
that 0 , S, and log (1+g) coefficients meet this requirement;
hence, we will reject the hypothesis that f = 9 = log (1+g)
= 0, that is, that there is no relationship between traffic and
income, average aircraft speed, and the time dependent trend.
The results of the regression analysis, therefore, indicate that
the terms income, average aircraft cruising speed, and the time
trend are significant at the 10 percent level of significance.
We can test the hypothesis that each of the significant
regression coefficients has a special value. This is equivalent
to computing the confidence interval for the coefficient. If
the hypothetical value of the coefficient is enclosed by the
confidence interval, the hypothesis is accepted; if not, it is
rejected. Thus, in our significance test we used the 10 percent
significance level. This really amounts to the error of exclud-
ing the correct value of the coefficient from the confidence
interval. Hence, the probability of including the correct value
of the coefficient in the confidence interval is 0.90. For
example, (income coefficient) is significant at the 10 per-
cent level of significance implies that the probability is 0.90
that the confidence limits will enclose the true coefficient.
Confidence limits are established for a confidence co-
efficient of 90 percent by substituting the value of t (= 1.782)
at 10 percent level of significance and for 12 degrees of free-
dom. For example, for the income coefficient
1.447 -$ 
-t = =.- 1.7820.666
. . /3 = 2.634 or 0.260
The limits that enclose the true value of the coefficient at
the 90 percent probability level are 0.260 and 2.634. Chances
are 90 out of 100 that the true value of P lies between these
two limits. Table 4.1 gives the confidence limits for all co-
efficients at 10 percent level of significance.
The empirical values of t-statistic for GNP, fare, and
the constant term are less than 1.782 for 90% confidence. This
implies that these terms are not significant in the regression
equation. The difference between the value of these coeffi-
cients and zero is small enough to be accounted by chance alone.
On the other hand, all the terms in the regression equation are
significant at 50 percent level of significance. (GNP at 20%,
Income at 5%, Fare at 50%, Speed at 10%, Time trend at 2%, and
the constant at 50%). The time trend turns out to be the most
significant term in the model.
The multiple correlation coefficient, R, measures the
degree of variation in the dependent variable, traffic, that is
associated with the explanatory variables, income, fare, etc.,
relative to the total variation in the explained variable. The
2value of the multiple coefficient of determination, R , measures
the percentage of the variance in the explained variable, traf-
fic, which is accounted for by the variance of all explanatory
variables in the regression equation taken in combination. The
quantity (1-R ) measures the percentage of the total variance
of traffic that can not be explained by the selected indepen-
dent variables. Table 4.1 gives the R to be 0.9967 in the
logarithmic form of the regression (Equation 4.2). In the
original form of the regression (Equation 4.1) R is 0.9943
which- implies that the selected variables explain 99.4% of the
variation in traffic in the sample data.
Table 4.1 also givew the F-statistic. This statistic
essentially tests whether the regression equation is significant
as a whole, that is to say, whether the independent variables
are significantly explaining the dependent variable. The higher
the F-statistic, the more confidence we can place in the re-
gression equation as a whole. For five independent variables,
a constant tern and 18 data points in the sample, the critical
F-statistic is found to be 2.39 at a significance level of 10
percent (Ref. 24, p. 241). The F-statistic in our case (725.563)
is far greater than the critical value.
The F-statistic has indicated that the regression equa-
tion is-significant as a whole-. The value of the multiple co-
2
efficient of determination (R ) showed that most of the vari-
ance in the dependent variable has been explained by the se-
lected independent variables. The Durbin-Watson coefficient
indicated that the error terms in the regression equation were
unrelated. In spite of the "goodness of fit," the model shows
at least three weaknesses. First, the standard error of the
regression coefficients are relatively large for all coeffi-
cients. Secondly, the arithmetic sign for the composite GNP
coefficient, o( , is negative and should indeed be positive.
Similarly, the arithmetic sign for the fare term is reversed.
This is caused by the presence of multicollinearity and/or
autocorrelation.
The problem of statistical estimation is usually com-
plicated by the presence of multicollinearity and autocorrela-
tion. It is very often the case with economic data that a re-
lationship exists between GNP and National Income. When such a
relation exists among two or more of the explanatory variables,
it is not possible to measure their separate influences upon the
explained variable. Although the regression equation remains
valid for prediction of the traffic from both GNP and National
Income together, the effect of a change in GNP or National In-
come on traffic cannot be determined separately. This phenome-
non is called multicollinearity. When multicollinearity exists,
the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are very large.
This implies that we will be very uncertain of the true value of
the coefficients. With multicollinearity, it is possible to
have very high multiple correlation and still be unable to re-
ject the hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero.
Multicollinearity is an inherent characteristic of the
economic data. Simply leaving out one of the correlated vari-
ables does not solve the problem as it then leads to the problem
of leaving out a significant variable. As in this case, where
forecasting is the primary objective, multicollinearity does
not present a serious problem as long as the systematic rela-
tionship of the explanatory variables may reasonably be expected
to continue in the future. Multicollinearity, however, does
prevent the determination of their separate influences.
Time-series economic data can seldom be regarded as
random samples. Gross National Product, National Income, and
other economic variables in a given year are usually correlated
with their value in a previous year. The term autocorrelation
is used to describe the lag correlation of a particular time-
series with itself, lagging by a number of time units. For
example, GNP observed in a time-series is autocorrelated if its
value in a period t is correlated with the value in period (t-i).
Autocorrelation would exist even if the value in period t is
correlated with the value in period (t-2) or (t-3), etc. Some-
times the term "serial correlation" is used to describe this
same concept, but some authors distinguish serial correlation
from autocorrelation. When this distinction is made, serial
correlation is used to describe the lag correlation between two
different time-series rather than the lag correlation of the
series with itself.
Several statistical tests have been developed to detect
mutual dependence of successive observations in time-series.
Two of these tests are described below. The Durbin-Watson* sta-
tistic (d) is a test to see whether the error term in the re-
gression in one time period is related to the error term in the
next period. If the errors were positively correlated, d would
tend to be relatively small while if the errors were negatively
correlate4 d would tend to be large. We would therefore, re-
quire a critical value of d, say d', such that if the observed
value of d is less than d' we may infer that positive autocorre-
lation exists at the significance level concerned.
Durbin and Watson22 have shown that exact critical
values of this kind can not be obtained. However, it is possi-
ble to calculate upper and lower bounds to the critical value
(dU and d L). If the observed value of d is less than dL, we
conclude that the value is significant, while if the observed
d is greater than dU, we conclude that the value is not signi-
ficant at the significance level concerned. If d lies between
dL and d U, the test is inconclusive. In the first model with
18 data points and five independent variables, dL and dU are
*The Durbin-Watson statistic is sometimes used to de-
termine whether a significant variable has been left out. For
example, if the value of d turns out to be fairly low (say 0.5),
the probability is high that an important independent variable
has been left out.
0.71 and 2.06 at 5 percent. The observed value of d (2.4709)
is higher than dU and is, therefore, not significant.
Another relatively powerful test for autocorrelation
23is the one devised by B.I Hart. This is the ratio of the mean
square successive difference to the variance, sometimes called
the "mean-square-successive-difference" method. This test can
be used to test for randomness in the errors or residuals in the
regression equation, since the foundations of regression analy-
sis depends on the assumption that the residual or error terms
be random. The residual or the error terms were computed using
the model as represented by Equation 4.3 and the regression co-
efficients presented in Table 4.1. These calculations are
shown in Table 4.2.
n-i 2
2 _ (u -u)M = i= 1 = 720153 ----- Eq.4.5
n-i 17
n
2Z (u. - Z)2
s = i=1 = 487465 ----- Eq.4.6
n 18
2
k = = 1.56 
-----Eq.4.7
5
From B. I. Hart's tables23 for 5 percent level of sig-
nificance and for 18 data points, a lower permissible value of k
is given as 1.34 and the upper permissible value is 2.89. Our
empirical k is about 1.56. Hence, the conclusion is that our
empirical k is not significant, that is, it is not significantly
different from the permissible values and so it is unlikely that
TABLE 4.2
Test For Randomness In The Residuals
Actual
Traffic
T.
1
1240
Computed
Traffic
1206
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
to 1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
T-
=U
Error or
Residual
u.=T.-T
3 1
33.8
5.1
-26.4
6.8
15.3
30.0
-38.0
-129.0
122.0
99.9
-80.3
162.0
67.6
-81.1
-154.0
93.3
-238.0
404.0
variable
regression equation
2
( i+l - ui
2
(-28.7)2= 822
2
(-31.5) = 992
2
(33.2) = 1100
2
(8.7) = 76
2
(14.7) = 216
(8.0)2 = 64
2
(-167.0) = 28000
2
(-151.0) = 22700
2
(-221.9) = 49100
2
(19.6) = 383
(242.3)2 = 58400
2
(-94.4) = 8900
2
(-148.7) = 22100
2
(-72.9) = 5300
2
(247.3) = 61000
(-331.3)2 = 110000
2(642.0) = 411000
2
u .-u )
2
-(-65.4) = 4280
(-94.1)2= 8850
2
(-125.6) = 15800
(-92.4)2= 8530
2
(-83 9) = 7020
2
(-69.2) = 4780
(-61.2) 2= 3750
(-228.2) = 52000
2
(32.8) = 1070
2
(-199.1) = 39600
2
(-179.5) = 32300
(62.8)2 = 3950
2
(-31.6) = 1000
2
(-180.3) = 32500
2(-253.2) = 64000
2(-5.9) = 35
(-337.2) = 114000
2
(304.8) = 93000
1353 1348
1455 1481
1582 1575
1762 1747
1969 1939
2144 2182
2222 2351
2612 2490
2699 2799
3096 3176
3777 3615
4023 3955
4519 4600
5040 5194
5773 5680
6057 6295
7438 7034
Actual traffic - dependent
Computed traffic using the
Mean absolute error = 99.2
significant autocorrelation exists in the series of residuals u.
The test is efficient in indicating the absence of autocorrela-
tion where in fact none exists, but it must be kept in mind that
this test may not indicate autocorrelation when in fact -some
does exist. 20
We can now conclude that the residuals or the regres-
sion errors are in fact random and thus regression analysis is
justified and valid on the sample data. However, multicollinear-
ity and autocorrelation are present among the independent vari-
ables in the first model (Equation 4.3). This then leads us to
a reformulation of the first model.
Model 2
tT. (t) = K D (t-1) F (t) V (t) (l+g)
1j c
----- Eq.4.8
It is noticed in Table 4.1 that the regression co-
efficient of composite GNP bears a negative sign. We would in
fact expect this sign to be positive, that is, an increase in
GNP should increase the travel demand. Besides the negative sign,
the significance level tests show that the term GNP is not signi-
ficant in this regression analysis. One final test is carried
out to test the significance of the GNP term in the regression
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analysis. In statistical literature it is called the Chow test.
Full text of the Chow test is given in Reference 25.
The Chow test is accomplished by comparing the least
squares residuals of two separate regression analyses; the first
regression analysis with the GNP as one of the explanatory vari-
ables and the second regression analysis with the GNP omitted as
an explanatory variable. We already have the results of the
first regression analysis (Equation 4.3 and Table 4.1). Equa-
tions 4..9, 4.10 and Table 4.3 give the similar results of the
second regression model where the variable GNP has been omitted
from the analysis.
(t
T. . (t) = K D (t-1) - F (t) - V (t) - (l-g)
13 c
------Eq.4.9
log T, .(t) = log K +/1 5 log D(t-1) +log F(t) +
log V (t) + log (l+g)-. t -----Eq.4.10
The appropriate test is an F-test using the following-statistic:
F =(S*- - Eq.4.1
S/N
* represents results of second regression analysis,
that is, with GNP omitted.
S = Sum of Squared Residuals
N = Number of degrees of freedom
= Number of observations less number of independent
explanatory variables including the constant K.
S = 0.0174543, N = (18-6) = 12 ----- From Table 4.1
S* = 0.0212448, N* = (18-5) = 13 -----From Table 4.3
(S*-S)-= 0.0037905, (N*-N) =1
F = 0.0037905/1 2.6
0.0174543/12
F-distribution Tables (Reference 21, p. 243) at 5
percent level of significance, 5 independent variables and 12
TABLE 4.3
Empirical Results - Model 2.
Estimated Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic
log K (constant) 2.1568
/4 (Income) o.4812
(Fare) -0.0971
(Speed) 0.3603
log (1+g) (Time) 0.0603
R2
F-Statistic (4,13)
Durbin-Watson Statistic -c
Sum of Squared Residuals
= 0.9960
= 806.647
= 2.2618
= 0.0212448
5.7952
0.3106
0.2812
0.01.67
0.3722
1.5491
-0.2074
1.2815
3.6115
degrees of freedom, give the permissible level for F to be 3.89.
Our empirical value of F ( = 2.6) is below the permissible.
Therefore, at the 5 percent level of significance we accept the
hypothesis that the explanatory variable GNP in this regression
analysis is insignificant.
The following section briefly investigates the signi-
ficance of the second regression model. The first point to no-
tice in Table 4.3 is that all coefficients, as well as the con-
stant term, have the correct sign. The critical "t" value at
10 percent level of significance for 13 degrees of freedom is
1.771. All four coefficients meet this requirement. The t
distribution also indicates that the most important term in the
regression equation is the time trend which is significant at
less than one percent level of significance. The F-statistic
value is higher than the first regression. The Durbin-Watson
statistic with a value of 2.2618 is not significant (dL = 0.82,
dU = 1.87 at 5%). The conclusion, therefore, is that the second
regression model has higher statistical validity than the first
one. In other words, removal of the independent variable compo-
site GNP improves the "goodness of the fit."
Model 3
T. (t) = K D (t) - F (t) - V (t) (1+g) -Eq.4.1213 c
The results of the second model indicate that the
standard errors around the estimated coefficients are still high.
The third model introduces a small modification to the income
variable in the second model. The time lag (e ) has been eli-
minated. Current year's income is correlated with current year's
traffic. The results are presented in Table 4.4. The statistics
TABLE 4.4
Empirical Results - Model 3.
Estimated
Coefficients
log K (constant)
( (Income)
(Fare)
(Speed)
log(l+g) (Time)
3.9829
0.5875
-0.2712
0.0897
0.0641
F-statistic (4,14)
Durbin-Watson statistic - d
sum of squared residuals
Standard
Error
4.3747
0.2437
0.3968
0.2168
0.0120
t-
statistic
0.9104
2.4107
-0.6836
0.4137
5.3593
= 0.9968
= 1081.13
= 2.6200
= 0.0203211
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shown indicate that this model represents an improvement over the
previous model. The standard errors around the estimated coef-
ficients show a slight improvement. In another case, not shown
here, a model was formulated by leading the income variable.
The results, although slightly better than those obtained by the
second model, were inferior to the third model. The forecast
presented in Chapter V is based on the empirical results of the
third model. Figure 4.2 presents the scatter plot showing ac-
tual and estimated traffic using the third model.
At this point it seems necessary to point out briefly
the significance of the numerical values of the regression coef-
ficients or partial elasticities. The empirical results related
to the third model (Eq. 4.12 and Table 4.4) show the income and
price elasticities to be 0.5875 and -0.2712 respectively. Many
research analysts in the field and airline executives would ques-
tion the numerical values of these elasticities. The author
would like to point out clearly that the numerical value of these
elasticities is a function of the demand model and the type of
data. The elasticity estimates fluctuate wildly with the inde-
pendent variables included in the demand model and with the
model's mathematical formulation. The fourth model is included
in the analysis to illustrate this very point.
Model 4
T..(t) = K - D (t-l) * F (t) ----- Eq.4.13
I-J
The independent variables are restricted to income and
fare together with a constant. Equation 4.13 shows the model form.
The empirical results are presented in Table 4.5. As seen in this
table the income elasticity is found to be 1.4913 compared to
0.5875 in the previous case. Likewise, price elasticity is -1.0996
compared to -0.2712. Comparison between various estimates of
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Figure 4.2
Scatter Plot - Actual vs. Estimated Traffic
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TABLE 4.5
Empirical Results - Model 4.
Estimated
Coefficient
Standard
Error
t-
Statistic
log K (constant)
/3
6
(Income)
(Fare)
F-statistic (2,15)
Durbin-Watson statistic - d
Sum of squared Residuals
- 0.9913
= 563.039
= 2.0513
= 0.0681148
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3.5691
1.4913
-1.0996
4.2484
0.2539
0.3895
0.8401
5.8731
-2.8230
elasticities are, therefore, meaningless. It is the model which
has to be justified on the basis of validity and forecasting
capabilities rather than the regression coefficients or elasti-
cities. In order to determine true values of demand elastici-
ties, the analyst has to carry out motivational market research
with the object of eliciting passenger response to different
stated fares.
A question often raised regarding forecasting models
is: "How much more accurate is this model compared to a direct
extrapolation of the historical trend?" Although there is no
direct way of comparing two models, an attempt is made here to
compare the forecasting quality of two models by measuring the
ratio of the standard error of regression of the forecast to the
standard error of regression of the extrapolation. Theil26
called this ratio relative index of forecasting quality and
defined it as:
Mean Square Error of Forecast M
RM = -oMean Square Error of Extrapolation M
x
If "good" forecasts are those that are superior to
extrapolation, the relative standard error provides a natural
scale for them: 0<RM<1. If RMyl, the forecast is, prima
facie, inferior. One would assume that there is no advantage to
be gained over direct extrapolation if RM is equal to unity. The
closer the value of RM is to zero-, the higher, presumably, the
validity of the forecast over extrapolation.
The following results are obtained when model 3 is
compared to a direct extrapolation model. The RM value is found
tobe 0.161. This would indicate that based on standard error
criterion only, the forecast produced by Model 3 is superior to
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the one produced by direct extrapolation.
It is to be noted that some forecasts which would
seem inferior on the basis of RMyl, are, nevertheless, relatively
efficient. This occurs when extrapolation is applied to a time-
series which is very volatile.
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CHAPTER V
FORECASTS AND ANALYSES
The results of four analytical models were presented
in the previous chapter. This chapter demonstrates the use of
one of these models to forecast the volume of North Atlantic
travel during the next fifteen years. The results of the fore-
cast are based on the third model shown in the previous chapter
together with the assumptions and the projected values of the
independent variables as outlined in the first two sections of
this chapter. The most probable forecast (Section 5.3) is bound-
ed by an upper and a lower limit produced through sensitivity
analysis as shown in the last section of this chapter. Full de-
tails of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Appendix E.
5.1 Assumptions
Certain fundamental assumptions are necessary to devel-
op a realistic traffic forecast. Most important are the future
conditions that may reasonably be expected to prevail during the
forecast time period. In this study the forecasts reflect the
following general economic, political, and transport-related as-
sumptions:
1. No major economic depression which would curtail
purchasing power and increase unemployment will
occur during the forecasting period.
2. The economic development in the U.S. and Europe
in matters affecting the demand for transportation
on the North Atlantic (population, overseas in-
vestment, national incomes) will continue to ex-
pand approximately at the rate of the past twenty
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year trend.
3. Balance of payments problems in the U.S. and in
European countries will not materially restrict
the normal growth of international travel or,at
least, the influence will only be temporary.
4. No political developments will impede the natural
growth of international trade and investments.
5. There will be no major world wars and regional
wars exceeding the present level of the Vietnamese
conflict.
6. No serious increase in international tensions.
7. The Concorde will be introduced in 1974 and the
U.S. SST in 1978. Each of these new aircraft
types will operate safely, obtain the operating
economics now projected for them and will not be
operationally restricted on the Atlantic.
8. The new aircraft introduced into the airlines'
fleet up to 1980 will continue to have progres-
sively larger productivity (rising faster than
costs except in the case of the 1st generation
SST) and that this will cause the average fare
to drop by 2.0% per year until 1974 and then 1.0%
per year through 1985.
9. There will continue to be an excess of transport
capacity.
10. .Airport facilities and hotel accomodations will
be built to sufficiently accommodate the traffic
increase and larger capacity aircraft.
11. Forecast volumes are "unconstrained" in the sense
that ground facilities are assumed not to limit
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the growth of air traffic in any greater degree
than in the past.
12. There will be no major change in the competition
offered by sea vessels on the North Atlantic.
13. The hypersonic transport and nuclear-powered air-
craft will not be introduced before 1985.
5.2 Projected Data
Chapter II, Table 2.1 showed the historical percentage
breakdown of U.S. and European traffic. It is now assumed that
during the forecast period the U.S. traffic as a percentage of
the total traffic will remain at 60 percent. Appendix Tables
B.19 and B.20 show the composite income per capita and GNP for
the period 1951 through 1969. The data shown in these tables
indicates the following for the period, 1951 through 1969:
1. U.S. National Income per capita grew at an average
rate of 4.6 percent per year.
2. European composite National Income per capita
grew at an average rate of 6.4 percent per year
3. U.S. GNP (constant 1966 dollars) grew at an
average rate of 4.0 percent per year.
4. European composite GNP (constant 1966 dollars)
grew at an average rate of 3.0 percent per year.
It was assumed that the average growth rate for in-
come per capita and GNP for the next fifteen years will remain
at the same level as the average rate during the period 1951-1969.
With these assumptions the projected values of composite income
per capita and GNP were determined. The results are shown in
Appendix Tables B.21 and B.22. It is difficult if not impossible
to get an unanimous vote of economists on the future growth rates
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of GNP and National Income. This process is difficult enough
for one country let alone several. The author reviewed numerous
forecasts and arrived at the conclusion that the average long-
term growth rates for Europe as a whole and the U.S. are likely
to follow the historical trend. Furthermore, the growth rates
of national and international economy are not under aviation
management control and, as such, are considered to be exogenous
to the model.
The typical New York-London fare was assumed to de-
cline at an average rate of 2% per annum until 1974 and 1% per
annum from 1974 to 1985. This assumption is relaxed in the
sensitivity analysis (Section 5.4) to determine the range in
growth in travel market with variation in fares.
The decline in fares is tied directly to the net
reduction in total operating costs. The basic assumption here
is that if competition is not restrained for various reasons,
that is, if it is operating perfectly, operating costs and fares
are equal. This implies that marginal cost equals average total
cost - the latter is at a minimum, and costs cover all the in-
ducements necessary to attract resources to produce the available
ton-miles. Fixed costs, although not a price-determining fac-
tor in the short-term analysis or individual city-pair analysis,
should be considered and recovered in the long-term case. Al-
though the implication in the above arguments is that fares are
based on precise and total economic and non-economic costs, the
realities of air transport are such that this is not possible.
The problem of ascertaining precise costs is complicated by al-
location of economic vs. non-economic, joint and common and
fixed vs. variable costs. Almost the only costs that can be
precisely ascertained at a particular time are the variable ones
that are specific. Pegruml8 discusses the cost allocation in
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detail and points out clearly that the variable specific costs
can only be used as a guide to minimum fare levels. Admittedly
cost allocation is a problem in the transport industry, however,
it is clear that on the long-term basis fare structure must
recover total costs if service is to continue.
Returning to the question of projected fare levels,
although inflation (both labour and material related) will in-
crease operating costs, it is assumed that productivity (air-
craft and labour) will increase at a greater rate than the in-
crease due to inflation. The net result is assumed to be a
reduction in total operating costs. Projections of the indivi-
dual cost elements are beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
it is interesting to note the result of the RAC study19 with
regard to cost-factor sensitivity. Appendix Figure E.2 shows
the sensitivity of total operating costs to changes in selected
model parameters for the U.S. SST. This exercise was conducted
to provide insight into critical areas of airline economics.
It was assumed that the Concorde will be introduced in
1974 and the U.S. SST in 1978, and further that by 1974, all air-
craft operating on the North Atlantic will be B-747. By 1978,
the proportion will be 90 percent B-747 and 10 percent Concorde.
By 1982, the fleet mix will have been changed to 70 percent B-747,
20 percent Concorde, and 10 percent U.S. SST. Table 5.1 gives
the fleet mix ratios and the average weighted aircraft speed on
the North Atlantic. Table 5.2 gives a summary of the projected
values of the predictor variables similar to the calibration data
in Table 3.1 in Chapter III.
5.3 Forecasts
This section presents the forecasts determined by
using Model 3 which is shown here by Equation 5.1.
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TABLE 5.1
Projected Fleet Mix and Weighted
Aircraft Speed
Concorde
(1400)
5%
10
15
20
20
U.S. SST
(1800)
5%
10
15
112
B-747
(620)
100%
95
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1985
Average
Weighted
Speed
620 MPH
659
688
796
894
953
TABLE 5.2
Projected Data
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
Composite
GNP(B) Inc./Cap.
$ 547
568
590
614
638
663
690
717
745
774
804
837
870
904
939
977
$ 3025
3177
3333
3505
3682
3868
4063
4269
4485
4712
4915
5203
5467
5746
6039
6348
Speed
Fare
$ 345
338
331
324
318
314
311
309
306
303
300
297
294
291
288
285
600
610
620
620
620
640
659
680
688
750
796
850
894
920
940
953
Source: Appendix Tables B21 and B22
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Time
21
Z2
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
0.5875 -0.2712 0.0897
T. (t) = 53.7 - D(t) - F(t) . V (t) - (1+0.0 6 6 )
----- Eq.5.1
Using the results of regression analysis, that is,
employing the estimated coefficients of the demand Eq. 5.1 and
values of the projected predictor variables in Table 5.2, total
traffic volumes were projected for the period 1970 through 1985.
If we assume that the transatlantic sea traffic will remain at
the present volume and that total charter traffic will be re-
stricted to a level of 20% of the total air traffic, then the
scheduled air traffic will grow at an average rate of 10.7 per-
cent per year for the next fifteen years. This traffic growth
pertains to the total scheduled carriers operating on the North
Atlantic, including the non-IATA member Icelandic Airlines. In-
dividual components of the traffic growth are shown in Table 5.3.
Traffic on the North Atlantic route has a natural
rate of growth of about 6.6% per year due to increases in popu-
lation, business and governmental activity in both U.S. and Eu-
rope and other factors such as improvements in air service,
publicity, levels of education, social influences, etc. The
influence of the population variable was not isolated, for the
effect was implicitly accounted for in the income variable and
the trend term. Because the length of the base period was limit-
ed, it was desirable to compress the explanatory data in the
demand equation into the smallest number of variables. This has
two advantages. There are fewer variables to forecast, and
secondly, reduction in the number of independent variables in-
creases the degrees of freedom in the statistical analysis of
a given data base.
The traffic levels forecast by the model are presented
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TABLE 5.3
Forecast Scheduled Air Traffic (000)
Total
Year Traffic
1969
1970
1971
1.972
1973
1.974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1.980
1.981
1982
1983
1984
1985
7438
8124
8978
9922
10952
12081
13342
1471.9
16229
17879
19830
21849
24296
26864
29650
32704
36053
Sea
Traffic
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
Charter
Traffic-
1545
171.6
1904
2030
2336
2588
2864
3166
3496
3886
4290
4779
5293
5850
6461
7131
Scheduled
Traffic Growth
5630
6179
6862
7618
81.22
9345
10354
11.455
12663
13983
15544
17159
39117
21171.
23400
25843
28522
Average
Growth
9.75
11.05
11.02
6.62
15.06
10.79
10.63
1.0.55
1.0.42
11.16
10.39
11.41
10.74
10.81
10. 44
10.37
10.7 %
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in Table 5.3. The exactness of the forecast will depend on four
basic assumptions:
1. The model remains valid throughout the forecast
period.
2. The forecast of the input to the model remains
valid.
3. The operating parameters, such as aircraft capa-
city, frequency, number of aircraft and airport
capacity, both with regard to aircraft and pas-
senger handling, do not take on values incompat-
ible with traffic growth.
4. The extent of influence of external factors, such
as changes in the political sphere, does not
change from the observed in the past twenty years.
The forecast represents what is considered the most
probable estimate based on the assumptions in Chapter V, Section
5.1. The actual results will vary upwards or downwards from
the forecast according to external influences or conditions ex-
ogenous to the model. For example, the travel demand on the
North Atlantic would change significantly if fares on the Pacific
were reduced drastically. The long-range trend may also be af-
fected by changes in governmental attitudes towards international
tourism, investment, fare policies and the tourist attraction of
competing routes. On the other hand, the year-to-year traffic
may change due to factors such as international exhibitions and
Olympic games. Another basic assumption of the forecast is that
the problem of providing adequate airports and airport-access
can and will be solved. Forecast volumes are, therefore, "un-
constrained" in the sense that ground facilities including
hotel capacity are assumed not to limit the growth of air traf-
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fic in any greater degree than in the past.
A study can only be as good as the data it depends on. In
this study not all of the data used comes from official sources
such as the government, IATA, the U.N.,etc. Reliance is placed
upon surveys and estimates based on experience. The use of this
type of data for establishing a model to project air passenger
travel might introduce an element of error for several reasons.
For example, the PONYA results were not incorporated directly
into the model, for the following'reasons:
1. The data was available for only three years. If one of
the years was abnormal it would bias the results.
2. The survey covered passengers arriving and departing
from the New York region only.
3. It is data from a survey sample rather than a survey
of the total population.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The forecast traffic growth rate of 10.7 percent per annum
reflects the assumptions and projected values of the independent
variables in the first two sections of this chapter. The validity
of these assumptions is, of course, debatable and the assumptions
can easily be changed to obtain different results for the fore-
cast. The purpose of this section is to do exactly that and
observe the sensitivity of the model.
The single most debated question at present is the
development of supersonic aircraft. There is no clear solution
for this question due to the uncertainty of its operating costs
and public acceptance. The simple analysis shown in Appendix E
demonstrates the use of the analytical model developed. Only the
economics of the SST are considered, assuming that the aircraft
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meets the noise and sonic boom requirements.
First, the empirical calibration of the analytical model
will be used to determine the impact of the independent variables
considered on traffic growth without the SST. It is again
emphasized that, although there are no simple solutions, it is
possible to make further assumptions and obtain preliminary
results. Since the purpose here is not to present an indepth
analysis, the results should be viewed with caution.
The inputs to the model are changed in at least two ways
if we assume that the Concorde and the U.S. SST will not be
introduced. The average speed across the Atlantic is reduced to
620 mph (B-747). Furthermore, it is assumed that the average
fares will now decline at an annual rate of 2 percent (current
prices) through the forecast period instead of 2 percent until
1974 and 1 percent beyond 1974 through 1985.
This produces an average annual growth of 10.6 perecnt
for the scheduled traffic compared to 10.7 percent with the SST
in operation. There are two factors at play simultaneously. The
decline in average aircraft speed reduces the traffic growth
by 0.3 percent per year and the bigger reduction in average fares
increases the total traffic by 0.2 percent per annum. The net
effect is a reduction of approximately one tenth of one percent
in annual growth rate for the scheduled traffic. In terms of
number of passengers, this implies that the demand in 1985 will
be diminished by about 300,000 passengers.
In order to answer the question, should the SST be devel-
oped, the reader is referred to the preliminary analysis shown
in Appendix E. This simple analysis indicates that the introduc-
tion of the SST in 1974 should provide the scheduled carriers
on the North Atlantic with an average gross operating profit
of $140 million per year from 1975 through 1985 or $1.54 billion
for the eleven year period.
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As indicated earlier, the most probable traffic growth for
the scheduled air carriers across the North Atlantic will be 10.7
percent per annum. In order to introduce an upper and a lower
bound to this forecast the following additional assumptions are
made:
1. The SST will be introduced as per current schedule and
the average yield will decline by two percent per year
(current dollars) through 1985.
2. The SST will not be introduced and the average yield
remains constant at the 1969 level of 5.1 cents per
revenue passenger mile.
The author takes these assumptions to be realistic variation
for determining an upper and a lower limit on the traffic growth.
With these assumptions taken into consideration the model indi-
cates the upper level to be at 10.9 percent and a lower level to
be at 8.1 percent.
Finally, it should be made perfectly clear that the fore-
gone sensitivity analysis investigates the variation of parameters
which can be considered "industry controlled". The international
airline industry has a direct control over transatlantic fares
and speed. On the other hand, it has little control over para-
meters such as national income and population. Dramatic changes
of the forecast level of these "exogenous" parameters can, there-
fore, have a significant effect on the traffic forecast presented
above.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Rational decision-making requires that the planner have
some idea about what will happen in the future. This study tries
to define in broad terms the prospect of travel demand on the
North Atlantic route for the next fifteen years. The forecast
is based on regression analysis using a past trend, an economic
index represented by national income per capita and transport
characteristics such as average transatlantic fare and speed. The
economic index is a weighted average of the U.S. and Europe.
The representative model chosen is a multiplicative function
of income, fare and speed raised to appropriate powers and a time
trend function. An effort was made to take into account the de-
lays after which the various factors exert their influence. The
first model shown in Chapter IV takes five factors into account
- the fifth being GNP per capita in constant dollars. Subsequently,
due to the close relationship between GNP and National Income,
GNP was shown to be insignificant in the model and was, therefore,
dropped in Model 2. The third model introduces the income para-
meter without the delay effect. This is the model finally used
to forecast the traffic in Chapter V. From the statistical evi-
dence shown in Chapter IV, Model 3 is superior and performs better
with the historical data.
The model appears to give valuable insights into long-
range forecasting when the independent variables are predicted
on a trend basis as well as on future expectations. The model is
responsive to changes in the independent variables as shown in
the sensitivity analysis in Chapter V. As such, the model can be
used to determine the effects of major policy decisions in the
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areas of transatlantic fares and the introduction of the SST.
As indicated in Chapter V, the most probable estimate of
the scheduled air traffic growth is 10.7 percent per year through
1985. Without the supersonic transport aircraft, preliminary
analysis shows this average annual growth rate to be 10.4 percent.
If, on the other hand, the supersonic transport was introduced
and the fares did not decline from the present level, the traffic
is likely to grow at 8.1 percent per year. The assumption of no
fare changes is based on current prices. Therefore, even when we
assume the existence of present level fares, there is an implicit
reduction in fares due to the expected inflationary trend. The
conclusion drawn from the sensitivity analysis in Chapter V is
that the scheduled air traffic growth will lie between 8 and 11
percent per year based on the assumptions outlined in the text.
The supersonic transport has the potential of providing
significant time savings. However, public acceptance is yet a
major unknown. On the North Atlantic, the supersonic plane is
expected to be competitive with the subsonic aircraft based on
the present projected costs. The demand for the SST will depend
on the public acceptance from the view point of noise, sonic
boom, the nature of pricing and, in the case of carriers, from
the view point of financing and scheduling.
The probable estimate of 10.7 percent growth assumes an
average reduction in fares of 2 percent per year until 1974 and
1 percent beyond that until 1985, based on current prices. The
reductions would, in fact, be greater in real values for the
average annual industry yield is forecast to decline, although
individual fares may increase or decrease from year to year. Fare
reductions will be possible as a result of reductions in operat-
ing costs for the industry. Although unit operating costs per ton-
mile on the North Atlantic vary from carrier to carrier due to
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route structure, fleet composition and geographic location, the
average unit costs for the industry are forecast to decline
steadily. The statistics for the Atlantic division of Pan Amer-
ican and Trans World Airlines are shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
These charts show a clear picture of fare reductions following
cost reductions over the past eighteen years and suggest that
the process is likely to continue, although probably at a slower
pace. The main reduction in unit operating costs resulting from
the introduction of jets between 1959 and 1964 has been diminished,
but further reductions can be expected as these aircraft are
fully depreciated and the newer subsonic'jets (B-747) are "run-in"
from the point of view of maintenance and operation.
The continuous trend towards increasing the number of seats
per aircraft (stretched versions) will also produce a reduction
in unit operating costs. Although there has been some discussion
about aircraft with a capacity of 750-1000 seats, it is unlikely
that these aircraft would be introduced before 1985. The present
forecast of traffic growth would not justify their introduction.
Secondly, the carriers are anticipating large capital expendi-
tures for the Concorde and later the U,S..SST and will probably
not approve the introduction of aircraft larger than an extended
version of the Boeing 747.
It is most likely that the actual results of the traffic
will differ from the forecast as the actual traffic data comes
in. Should the forecast be then revised and if so when? Long-
range forecasts should not be revised based on one or two years
of new data. However, it is recommended that the forecasts be
revised when more is known about the SST, for example, the year
of introduction, the level of penetration, its operating costs
and the fare structure. New data should be introduced periodically
and related to the previous data. It may be necessary to re-
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consider the adopted model if it appears that the basic assump-
tions have become quite unlikely and that one or more of them
must be revised.
There are still many areas that have to be explored more
thcroughly, especially the composition of the market, passenger
motivation and consumer choice. For example, rising standards
of living are not in themselves sufficient for the growth of air
travel, because the desire to travel has to be stronger than the
ability to pay for it. If people started buying luxury cars and
replacing them sooner, will they have enough money left over for
foreign travel?
At the present time the traffic growth, in general, is
low. It is, nevertheless, essential that long-range studies should
not be influenced by impressions due merely to recent and short-
term developments. It would be a mistake for a mediocre year
to lead to a revision of a forecast for the next fifteen years.
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APPENDIX A
Future Aviation Technology
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Future North Atlantic traffic growth will be influenced
by aviation technology in at least two ways. The supersonic
transport will be affected by the greater speeds it can attain,
the subsonic transport will be most affected by the reduction
in the fares brought about through reduction in operating costs
per seat-mile. The following section throws some light on avia-
tion technology which may influence the North Atlantic growth
either through reduction in fares or through increases in speed.
Aircraft
Looking ten years ahead, it is apparent that there will be
two main lines of development in civil aircraft. One is the
development of high capacity subsonic jets while the other is the
introduction of supersonic transport.
Subsonic
The most recent aircraft to go into transatlantic scheduled
service was the Boeing 747. It is anticipated that the B-747 will
operate at about 20 % lower operating costs than the present
B-707 and DC-8 and slightly lower than the present stretched DC-8.
An important feature of the B-747 is believed to be its passenger
appeal. Although the 747 is only slightly faster than the 707, it
will be more comfortable for long-haul operations. In high density
configuration, that is, ten abreast with minimal seat-pitch, the
747 could carry 490 passengers. With nine abreast in the economy
section and seats that are 10 % wider than those in present jets,
the 747 should have a high passenger appeal.
The next subsonic aircraft to go into North Atlantic service
will most probably be the Lockheed L-10ll-8.4A. This is an extended
-range version of the L-10ll-1, which was designed for high-
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density U.S. domestic routes. This aircraft is expected to have
a 5000-5500 mile range and a gross weight of approximately
600,000 pounds.
It is possible that by 1975 Boeing will have produced a
stretched version of the 747. Such an aircraft will resemble the
C-5A Galaxy with a seating capacity of approximately 650. A
commercial version of the C-5A is also another possibility. Due to
the capability of carrying a greater payload, these aircraft will
possess higher productivity and, therefore, maintain lower unit
operating costs. These two high capacity subsonic jets will be the
first type of aircraft to provide a cheap form of mass transporta-
tion. With high productivity and lower unit direct operating
costs, one can expect the continuation of the downward trend in
transatlantic fares. It is pointed out, however, that part of
this decline in direct operating costs will be offset by an in-
crease in indirect operating costs due to the continuous inflation-
ary trend.
Supersonic
The first supersonic transatlantic aircraft to go into
service could be the Russian SST, TU-144. If the airlines of the
Western World decide to purchase the TU-144, it could be operating
by 1972, a two-year lead over the Concorde. The TU-144 will offer
seating for 120 and cruise at 1550 mph with a range of about
4000 miles.
The Concorde is scheduled to go into service in 1974. With
a capacity for servicing 128 passengers, it will cruise at 1400
mph and have a range of 4000 miles. Approximately 200-250 Con-
cordes are expected tobe in service by 1980, at an estimated cost
per aircraft of 20 million dollars. Direct operating costs per
seat-mile for the Concorde will be about 25 % higher than the
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present subsonic jets and about 30 % above the U.S. SST. This
estimate is based on a 3600-mile range. Therefore, it is anti-
cipated that there will be a surcharge on the SST in order for
the airlines to earn an equal rate of return on their investment.
SST service, as a premium priced transportation, will attract
those travelers to whom time is of prime importance and cost of
transportation is secondary. The SST transatlantic fare will
probably be somewhere between the economy and the first class
fare on subsonic jets.
Speed has always been an important factor in the deter-
mination of air travel demand. The introduction of the piston
aircraft over the North Atlantic followed by the jet has proved
this quite conclusively. Speed has appealed to both the business-
man and the pleasure traveler. To the businessman, time means
money. The pleasure traveler, on the other hand, has been able
to get farther as a result of the availabilty of higher speeds.
It is believed that most of the passengers who presently travel
first class and are willing to pay a substantial surcharge for
comfort and luxury will pay the SST surcharge for the speed
advantage. The decision, subsonic versus supersonic trip, will
be based on some evaluation of the fare savings versus the trip
time savings.
It is very likely that a stretched version of the Concorde
will also emerge. This super Concorde will have a capacity of
around 250 and approximately a 6000-mile range. It is unlikely
that the super Concorde will enter the market before 1978 due,
in part, to the heavy capital investment for research and
development. The U.S. SST, B-2707, will probably go into service
in 1978. It will have a cruising speed of 1800 mph, a capacity
of 280 seats, a range of around 4000 miles and cost per aircraft
is estimated at 40 million dollars.
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Successive generations of civil aircraft will be progres-
sively faster, more comfortable, more economic to operate and
have larger capacities. These qualities, a product of advanced
aircraft design technology, will be a significant factor con-
tributing to the air travel demand in the next fifteen years.
Aircraft in the 1980's
Technically it is possible to build nuclear-powered
aircraft and hypersonic transport by 1985 provided that financial
support can be obtained for the necessary research and development.
Until a few years ago nuclear power for aero-engines was consid-
ered impractical for two main reasons: the weight of the shield
needed for protection from radiation and the danger involved
in case of an accident. Recent calculations show that the weight
of the shield is on the order of 400,000 pounds. This is the same
order of magnitude as the weight of the fuel required for the
B-747, C-5A and the B-2707. With added shielding, it will be
possible to provide full crash protection for the reactor. That
is to say, that in the worst possible accident, the reactor will
not break out of its shield to release radiation, nor will its
afterheat melt down or explode the shield. Current technology
indicates the feasibility of a one-million pound aircraft with
unlimited range cruising at Mach 0.7-0.8 and capable of carrying
a 200,000-pound payload. Future technology, with advanced aero-
dynamic propulsion and weight design, could easily increase the
above payload to 350,000 pounds with a speed up to Mach 0.9.
Nuclear-powered aircraft are a potential source of lower
cost transportation. The cost per unit of energy produced by
nuclear fuel is about one-eighth that for chemical fuel. There
are, of course, other factors to be considered, for example,
original R&D investment, ground handling costs and maintenance
costs.
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Technological Advances in Special Areas
Structures
During the next fifteen years, it is anticipated that
research into structures and materials will achieve higher
strength/weight ratios. Improvement in strength and/or reduction
in weight will be made possible through the use of advanced
titanium alloys and composite materials instead of aluminum.
Lighter structure weight, which could be as much as 30 % improved,
would enable greater payload and increased profitability of the
aircraft. However, the composite materials would be very costly
unless use can be found for these materials in industries other
than aviation.
Propulsion
Regarding subsonic jet engines, it is expected that within
the next fifteen years significant improvements will take place
in the areas of specific fuel consumption and thrust to weight
ratio. Specific fuel consumption can be improved by increasing
thermal and propulsive efficiency through the use of advanced
material technology and more effective methods of cooling. Coupled
with increased pressure ratios, this will result in a much higher
thermal efficiency. Propulsive efficiency, on the other hand,
can be improved by increasing the by-pass ratio. Advanced turbo-
fans with better component aerodynamics and higher thermal and
propulsive efficiencies could reduce specific fuel consumption
substantially.
Thrust to weight ratio will be improved by increasing
thrust and/or reducing the weight. Higher operating temperatures
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with increased airflow capacity will produce higher thrusts. The
weight of the future jet engines will be significantly reduced
through the use of new materials, especially the new composite
products.
Aerodynamics
In aerodynamics there are two areas in which technological
developments will improve the performance of jet aircraft and
eventually reduce the direct operating costs. The first is the
lift to drag ratio in cruise, and the second is the maximum lift
coefficient of a wing.
Lift to drag ratios of around 20 at cruise Mach 0.9 and
even around 30 at Mach 0.85 are possible by reducing wave drag,
induced drag and profile drag. The next fifteen years will un-
doubtedly bring about improved wing aerofoil cross-section, more
advanced lift distribution over the wing surfaces, sophisticated
methods of controlling boundary layers and significantly reducing
skin friction.
Air Traffic Control
A very serious obstacle facing the airlines is the in-
adequacy of the present air traffic control systems to handle
the growing level of aviation traffic. Delays in aircraft move-
ment on the ground and in the air around terminals are costing
the airlines millions of dollars annually in fuel and inability
to meet schedules on time. The problem, unless attacked system-
atically and scientifically, will deteriorate in the coming years
for at least three reasons: the growing number of civil and
general aviation aircraft, the introduction of high speed air-
craft and the change in mix of fleet. Furthermore, the inability
to handle the rapidly growing traffic will not only be costly
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but will present a very serious threat to safety.
It is unlikely that arevolutionary ATC system will emerge
in the coming decade. It is anticipated, however, that technolo-
gical advances and a higher level of sophistication in equipment
for navigation, communication, identification and improvement in
the measurment and prediction of atmospheric conditions will
produce a more responsive ATC system which is safe and capable
of handling the future aviation traffic growth efficiently, both
enroute as well as at the terminal. A factor which will increase
the level of safety and efficiency would be the introduction
of a high speed electronic computer in the ATC system.
The coming decade will also witness the ATC system at the
terminal bring in all weather operations. All large aircraft, at
least, will be capable of operating under zero visibility con-
ditions. This will reduce spacing or separation minimums, thereby
reducing delays, relieving congestion and implicitly increasing
airspace and runway capacity. Furthermore, reduction in terminal
delays will reduce effective block times and reduce direct
operating costs of the fleet.
Enrcute over the North Atlantic the ATC system is expected
to improve through advanced and highly accurate navigational
equipment, which will improve flight efficiency by reducing
direct operating costs and relieving congestion in the air. For
example, reduction in separation standards would enable the pilot
to select optimum flight profiles with respect to weather, cruise
speed or fuel cost. This would increase the efficiency of air
space usage without degrading safety.
It is anticipated that by 1975 a North Atlantic Satellite
will be in operation. The current state of the art indicates the
feasibility of applying satellite technology to aeronautical
communications and air traffic control. The costs, which would
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be high, would most likely be borne by carriers operating on the
North Atlantic, The satellite would provide improved communication
and positive world-wide ATC surveillance through finite position
determination. Surveillance in ATC will consist of providing a
means of determining the position of each and every aircraft in
real-time and communicating this position to the ground controller.
At present an urgent need is foreseen for a communication satellite
over the North Atlantic, for, according to one study, peak instant-
aneous number of aircraft operating today in the communication
gap for the Atlantic, is 82. This number is estimated to be 143
by 1980.
Sensitivity Analysis
In a competitive airline industry, fares will tend to be
depressed by competition toward the point where they are just
equal to the long-range marginal cost (including return on the
investment) of providing a passenger trip on an aircraft. If we
assume that the airlines will allocate their capital investment
in operating equipment in such a way that all equipment earns
essentially the same rate of return, and if it is further assumed
that competition forces the load factor on all types of planes
to very nearly the same level, then the fare differential must
accurately reflect the cost of operating the two different air-
craft. This then implies that fares are derived directly from
the operating costs and capital costs of the various aircraft.
The following section will demonstrate the sensitivity
of projected technological advances on the unit operating costs
of an aircraft. It is emphasized that although the calculations
performed in this section are by no means exact, they are useful
in illustrating the sensitivity of expected technological ad-
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vances on the ticket price. The technical material is taken from
the lectures presented to a graduate class in Flight Trans-
portation, M.I.T. Two examples are shown here. In the first ex-
ample the typical unit operating costs are shown for a present
B-707 intercontinental aircraft. The second example shows the
impact on unit operating costs, if the same aircraft were to be
designed in 1980 with advanced technology in the following three
areas:
1. A reduction of 30 percent in the structural weight of
the aircraft.
2. An increment of 100 percent in the ratio of thrust to
weight of the propulsion unit.
3. An increment of 10 percent in the ratio of lift to
drag in cruise altitude.
In both examples the payload is kept constant. In the se-
cond example some arbitrary method is used to take account of
the higher costs for composite material as well as higher labour
costs.
EXAMPLE 1. A Typical Present Boeing 707
The direct operating costs consist of the following
categories:
Depreciation
Maintenance
Crew
Fuel
Insurance
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The initial cost of the aircraft is made up of the cost
of the aircraft less engines, cost of the engines and the cost
of the spare parts. The cost of the aircraft less engines is
given by the equation,
N-
Cost of the aircraft/lb. wt. = C + C1
This cost depends on the production run (N) and the learning
curve (p). In this case (C0=5,000 and C1=150) for a production
run of 500 aircraft and an 85 % learning curve, the cost per
pound weight of the aircraft is found to be 56 dollars. In other
words, for an aircraft frame weighing 100,000 pounds, the cost
is 5.6 million dollars.
The engine cost is based on $15 per pound of thrust and
a thrust to weight ratio of 3 for the engines. Then for a four-
engined aircraft,
Total Thrust = 4 x 20,000 = 80,000 lbs.
Engine Cost = 15 x 80,000 = $1.2 million
We now assume that the spare parts consist of 40 percent
for the engines and 10 percent for the airframe. The total cost
for the spare parts is then'equivalent to $1.04 million. The
total cost of the aircraft is made up as follows:
Airframe = $ 5.6 million
Engines = 1.2
Spare Parts = 1.04
Total = $ 7.84 million
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Depreciation Cost
C
D =
U x Y
where:
D = depreciation cost in $/flight hour
C = total initial cost of the aircraft ($7.84 million)
U = annual utilization in hours (4000)
Y = depreciation period in years (12)
D = 162
Maintenance Cost
We assume that maintenance costs in dollars per flight
hour for the airframe is equal to that for the engines. We further
assume that labour maintenance costs are about equal to materials
maintenance costs. For commercial jet transport aircraftit is
generally true that one man-hour of maintenance is required per
15,000 pounds of airframe weight per flight hour. Since the air-
frame for our Boeing 707 weighs approximately 100,000 pounds, we
require 7 man-hours of maintenance per flight hour for the air-
frame labour. According to our assumptions that labour and
materials maintenance are equal in cost and that airframe and
engines' maintenance are equivalent, we require a total of 28
man-hours per flight hour. If we price a man-hour at $ 4, the
maintenance cost becomes $ 112 per flight hour. Applying an 80 %
burden or overhead, the total maintenance cost for the Boeing
707 per flight hour becomes $ 200.
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Crew Cost,
The- ATA formula for- calculating the crew costs far subsonic
international flights is based on the gross weight of the aircraft.
This is given by the following- eqtiationt
Crew cost ($) = 0.05 x G.W + 135 = $ 145
Flight Hour 1000
where:
G.W = Gross Weight = 200,000 lbs.
Fuel Cost
The fuel costs are calculated using the fundamental Breguet
Range Formula-. The simplified form of this formula is given by
the equation,
w
Wl
where:
Wf = weight of fuel
W = initial weight of the aircraft
R = range
V = block speed
L/D = lift to drag ratio
c = thrust specific fuel consumption
For the New York - London trip (3,500 miles) with fuel
reserves- for alternate, margin and hold (1,000 miles), the range
R is equal to 4,500 miles. If we assume W to be 200,000 pounds,
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V to be 500 mph, L/D to be 18 and c to be 0.7, then the above
formula produces the weight of the fuel required to be 60,000
pounds for this trip. Now if we assume the cost of the fuel to
be 0.015 dollars per pound, the total cost for the fuel for the
New York - London trip (7 hours) is $ 900 or approximately $ 130
per flight hour.
Insurance Cost
Hull insurance is usually based on a rate of about 2 per-
cent of the aircraft value. It is pointed out that the aircraft
value does not include the value of the spare parts.
Insurance Cost
Flight Hour
0.02 x 6.8 x 10 6
4,000
Total Direct Operating Costs per Flight Hour
Depreciation
Maintenance
Crew
Fuel
Insurance
Total
= $ 162
= 200
= 145
= 130
= 34
= $ 671
Assuming that the aircraft has 130 seats and that the
average load factor is 50 percent, then the cost per seat-mile
is 1.03 cents and the cost per passenger-mile is 2.06 cents.
Indirect operating costs are usually taken to be equivalent to
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= $ 34
*100 percent of the direct operating costs. This, then, produces
a total cost of 4.12 cents- per passenger-mile. If we add 20 per-
cent to this to account for profits, taxes, etc., the ticket
price works out to be 4.95 cents per passenger-mile. Although
the above calculations are approximate, the final results are
of sufficient accuracy to illustrate the point. In this example
the cost of a return trip New York - London (7,000 miles) is
found to be 350 dollars and that is fairly accurate when com-
pared to the present day fare.
EXAMPLE 2. Boeing 707 - Advanced Technology
It is assumed that ten years from now advanced technology
will permit 30 percent reduction in structural weight, 100 percent
increment in the thrust to weight ratio for the engine, and 10
percent increment in the lift to drag ratio together with a 10
percent increment in the block speed. It is further assumed that
the cost per pound of the structure weight will double as well as
cost per pound of thrust. Further, the inflationary trend will
* This appears to be true for the scheduled carriers. However,
the same rule of thumb does not apply to charter operations. For
the total U.S. Supplemental industry, the indirect operating costs
were 42.4 percent of the direct operating costs in 1967 and 51.1
percent in 1968.
# This assumption may not be extremely accurate. If, for example,
the demand for the composite materials was heavy, the price per
pound could be as low as the present day cost or even lower. Such
a demand can be envisaged if the composite materials were to be
used in industries other than aviation.
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double the labour costs as well as the insurance costs. Finally,
the crew costs will probably increase 50 percent. Calculations,
similar to the previous example, indicate the following direct
costs per flight hour.
Depreciation = $ 128
Maintenance = 120
Crew = 210
Fuel = 97
Insurance = 48
Total = $ 603
Again assuming that the aircraft has 130 seats and that
the average load factor is 50 percent, total cost for the New
York - London trip can be determined.
Direct costs per seat-mile = 0.84 cents
Direct cost per passenger-mile = 1.68
Indirect cost per passenger-mile = 1.68
Total cost per passenger-mile = 3.36
Ticket price (1.2 x total cost) = 4.05 cents/RPM
New York - London fare (bothways)= 285 dollars
The two examples show the impact of technological advances
as translated into fares. The second example shows that the oper-
ating costs, and hence the ticket price, would be about 18 percent
lower for the advanced aircraft on the basis of an equal rate of
return on both types of equipment. Such an advanced design is
within the realm of technology. A point which should be kept in
mind is that both examples use an average load factor of 50 per-
cent. This resembles the operations of the scheduled carriers
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throughout the year. If, on the other hand, these aircraft were
to be used for charter operations (90% load factor) the cost of
the New York - London trip would then be $192 on the present
Boeing 707 and $156 on an advanced aircraft. These costs, with
a higher load factor, are more in line with what the charter
carriers offer on the North Atlantic. The $192 trip is almost
exactly the rate offered by present day supplemental carriers,
which operate with load factors on the order of 90 percent. This
also illustrates the point indicated earlier, that it is due to
the high load factors that the charter carriers can offer trans-
portation at a rate significantly below the scheduled carriers.
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APPENDIX B
Tables of Traffic and Economic Data
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TABLE Bl
Gross National Product of Europe
In Constant 1966 Prices
Country
Austria 4.8
Belgium 10.9
Denmark 6.1
France 50.7
Germany 47.8
Greece 2.6
Iceland 0.2
Ireland 2.1
Italy 27.9
Luxemburg o.4
Netherlands 10.1
Norway 4.2
Portugal 2.0
Spain 11.3
Sweden 11.9
Switzerland 7.6
United Kingdom69.2
Total
4.8
10.8
6.2
52.3
52.0
2.6
0.2
2.1
29.1
0.5
10.3
4.3
2.0
11.8
12.3
7.9
69.0
5.0
11.2
6.5
53. ?
56.2
2.9
0.3
2.2
31.3
0.5
11.2
4.5
2.1
11.7
12.7
8.3
72.0
5.5
11.6
6.7
56.1
60.6
3.0
0.3
2.2
32.5
0.5
12.0
4.7
2.3
12.5
13.4
8.8
74.9
6.1
12.2
7.7
59.0
67.7
3.2
0.3
2.3
34.6
0.5
12.9
4.8
2.3
13.2
13.8
9.3
77*4
6.4
1295
6.9
62.4
72.4
3.5
0.4
2.2
36.2
0.5
13.3
5.1
2.4.
14.2
14.3
9.8
78.4
269.8 278.2 292.3 307.6 326.3 341.0
Source: Agency for International Development. Ref.27
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6.8
12.8
7.2
65.6
76.6
3.7
0.4
2.2
38.2
0.5
13.8
5.2
2.5
14.6
14.7
10.1
80.1
355.0
191 19j2 1953 1254 155 11
TABLE B2
Gross National Product of Europe
In Constant 1966 Prices
Country 1958 1959 1960 1961
Austria 7.0
Belgium 12.8
Denmark 7.4
France 67.4
Germany 79.0
Greece 3.8
Iceland 0.4
Ireland 2.2
Italy 40.0
Luxemburg 0.5
Netherlands 13.7
Norway 5.2
Portugal 2.6
Spain 15.2
Sweden 14.9
Switzerland 9.9
United Kingdom80.3
7.2
13.1
8.0
69.o4
84.5
4.0
0.4
2.3
42.,6
0.5
14.5
5.4
2.7
14.7
15.8
10.7
83.7
7.8
13.8
8.5
74.5
91.8
4.1
0.4
2.4
45.3
0.6
15.7
5.7
2.9
15.3
16.3
11.3
88.0
362.2 379.5 404.4 425.9 444.8 464.6
Source: Agency for International Development. Ref.27
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1962
8.4
15.3
9.5
8303
100.8
4.8
0.4
2.6
51.9
0.6
16.9
6.2
3.3
18.5
17.9
12.7
91*7
8.2
14.4
9.0
77.8
96.8
4.6
0.4
2.5
48. 9
0.6
16.3
6.0
3.1
17.1
17.2
12.1
90.9
1963
8.8
15.9
9.6
87.3
104.2
5.2
0.5
2.7
54.7
0.6
17.5
6.5
3.5
19.9
10.7
13.3
95.7
Total
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TABLE B3
Gross National Product of Europe
In Constant 1966 Prices
Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Austria 9.4 9.6 10.0 10.3 10.8 11.4
Belgium 17.0 17.6 18.1 18.6 19.4 20.2
Denmark 10.4 10.9 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.5
France 92.5 96.7 101.4 105.8 110.8 116.1
Germany 111.0 116.8 119.6 119.6 124.8 130.3
Greece 5.7 6.1 6.6 6.9 1.3 7.8
Iceland 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ireland 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4
Italy 56.3 58.2 61.4 65.3 68.7 72.3
Luxemburg 0.6 0.7 a.? .7 0.7 0,7
Netherlands 19.2 20.2 20,8 21.9 22.9 23.9
Norway 6.9 7.3 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.6
Portugal 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.3 6.8 7.1
Spain 21.2 22.8 24.6 25.5 27.1 28.8
Sweden 20.1 20.8 21.3 22.0 23.0 24.1
Switzerland 14.0 14.6 15.0 15.2 15.6 16.2
United Kingdom101.4 103.7 105.3 106.7 110.5 114.5
Total 492.7 513.4 522.0 545.9 571.3 597.1
Source: Agency for International Development. Ref.27
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TABLE B4
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - Aliens
1953 1954 1955 19516
Pax Pax. % Pax. % Pax. % Pax.
Belgium 6.5
Denmark 7.4
France 71.5
Germany 123.4
Greece 13.1
Iceland -
Ireland 8.5
Italy 28.9
Netherlands 31.1
Norway 11.8
Portugal 5.6
Spain -
Sweden 12.7
Switzerland -
U.K. 152.6
Other Europel7.5
1.3
1.5
14.6
25.2
2.7
1.7
5.9
6.3
2.4
1.1
2.6
31.1
3.6
8.1
9.2
84.7
87.2
6.3
11.3
34.3
35.2
12.4
5.8
13.0
161.0
26.8
1.6
1.9
17.1
17.6
1.3
2.3
6.9
7.1
2.5
1.2
2.6
32.5
5.4
10.0
10.1
82.8
43.0
5.0
14.3
37.8
38.7
12.9
5.5
13.7
171.0
24.6
2.1
2.2
17.6
9.2
1.1
3.0
8.1
8.2
2.7
1.2
2.9
36.5
5.2
7.8
10.5
86.3
54.3
6.7
15.5
57.2
39.1
11.9
6. 6
14.4
184.2
26.1
1.5
2.0
16.6
10.4
1.3
3.0
11.0
7.5
2.3
1.3
2.8
35.3
5.0
8.7
12.4
88.1
73.9
12.1
15.1
70.0
41.4
12.4
6.4
13.7
172.4
35.8
% Pax. % Pax. %
1.5 12.6 1.9 13.7 1.8
2.2
15.7
13.1
2.2
2.7
12.4
7.4
2.2
1.1
2.4
30.7
6.4
17.4
98.6
107.9
16.6
17.3
77.3
51.0
11.6
7.e
11.3
16.3
5.6
182.8
26.4
2.6
14.9
16.3
2.5
2.6
11.7
7.7
1.8
1.2
1.7
2.5
0.8
27.7
4.0
31.4
110.7
99.5
8.3
24.8
65.0
65.3
13.9
16.8
21.4
17.9
14.4
224.3
20.1
4.2
14.8
13.3
1.1
3.3
8.7
8.7
1.9
2.2
2.9
2.4
1.9
30.0
2.7
490.6 100.0 495.3 100.0 469.4 100.0 520.6 100.0 562.4 100.0 660.5 99.9 747.5 99.9
Source: INS
1951 1952_ 1957
Europe
TABLE B5
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - Aliens
1958
Pax. %
Belgium 18.1
Denmark 41.4
France 117.8
Germany 100.8
Greece 10.4
Iceland -
Ireland 24.1
Italy 76.0
Netherlands66.3
Norway 15.1
Portugal 15.9
Spain 28.4
Sweden 16.9
Switzerlandl7.6
U.K. 251.3
Other Europell.9
2.2
5.1
14.5
12.4
1.3
3.0
9.4
8.2
1.9
2.0
3.5
2.1
2.2
31.0
1.4
1959 . 1960 1961 1962
Pax. % Pax. % Pax. % Pax. %
19.5
43.5
122.6
105.1
9.6
25.9
66.7
84.1
15.5
15.0
35.1
14.0
19.1
281.8
24.5
Europe 869.4 100.0 1026.0
2.2
5.0
14.1
12.1
1.1
3.0
7.7
9.7
1.8
1.7
4.0
1.6
2.2
32.4
2.4
24.3
56.2
142.7
123.5
11.4
30.9
84.2
99.7
12.3
18.7
38.1
10.3
22.7
326.5
28.8
99.9 1090.2
1963
Pax. _
2.4 20.7 1.9 25.2 2.1 29.2
5.5 63.0 5.8 69.8 5.7 71.8
13.9 138.5 12.7 164.4 13.4 162.7
12.0 142.8 13.1 154.7 12.6 163.5
1.1 12.5 1.1 13.5 1.1 15.3
- - - 26.2 2.1 33.4
3.0 26.5 2.4 43.8 3.6 47.3
8.2 90.2 8.3 99.1 8.1 111.0
9.7 104.8 9.6 110.3 9.0 100.4
1.2 14.1 1.3 13.4 1.1 12.7
1.8 17.4 1.6 19.8 1.6 23.0
3.7 46.8 4.3 45.8 3.7 48.2
1.0 9.6 0.9 11.4 0.9 14.9
2.2 27.5 2.5 32.8 2.7 34.4
31.8 347.0 31.8 381.4 31.1 402.8
2.6 16.5 1.3 15.4 1.2 20.5
99.9 1228.1 100.1 1286.0 100.1 1626.3
2.3
5.6
12.7
12.7
1.2
2.6
3.7
8,6
7.8
1.0
1.8
3.7
1.2
2.7
31.3
1.3
100.1
Source: INS
TABLE B6
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - Aliens
1964
Pax. %
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
CA Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
Other Europe
Europe
39.7
89.6
205.3
214.1
17.1
50.9
53.3
129.8
121.3
11.8
29.6
66.5
18.8
49.0
509.0
20.5
2.4
5.5
12.6
13.2
1.1
3.1
3.3
8.0
7.5
0.7
1.8
4.1
1.2
3.0
31.3
1.3
1626.3 100.1
1965
Pax.
42.3
95.5
211.6
229.0
17.4
64.6
64.4
138.0
122.3
11.1
32.0
76.6
16.5
52.8
551.4
21.1
1966 1967
Pax. % Pax.
2.4
5.5
12.1
13.1
1.0
3.7
3.7
7.9
7.0
0.6
1.8
4.4
0.9
3.0
31.6
1.2
42.8
96.7
230.9
265.7
33.4
66.7
66.4
165.5
125.9
13.9
49.0
89.3
18,5
56.4
589.6
17.9
1746.6 99.9 1928,6
2.2
5.0
12.0
13.8
1.7
3.5
3.4
8.6
6.5
0.7
2.5
4.6
1.0
2.9
30.6
0.9
52.5
112.7
278.3
298.8
47.6
72.5
79.0
174.7
141.8
21.0
53.0
96.2
19.9
69.6
660.4
23.2
1968 1969
Pax. % Pax. %
2.4
5.1
12.6
13.6
2.2
3.3
3.6
7.9
6.4
1.0
2.4
4.4
0.9
3.2
30.0
1.1
64.9
124.9
250.9
330.1
57.5
47.4
87.8
196.1
162.9
25.2
62.5
104.1
21.1
69.6
738.3
45.5
2.7
5.2
10.5
13.8
2.4
2.0
3.7
8.2
6.8
1.1
2.6
4.4
0.9
2.9
30.9
1.9
99.9 2201.2 100.1 2388.8 100.0
86.2
136.8
301.0
377.9
63.3
48.8
95.4
212.2
184.2
27.8
73.9
119.0
25.2
80.5
837.0
70.0
2739.2
Source: INS
3.1
5.0
11.0
13.8
2.3
1.8
3.5
7.7
6.7
1.0
2.7
4.3
0.9
2.9
30.6
2.6
99.9
TABLE B7
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - U.S.Citizens
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Pax. % Pax. % Pax. % Pax. _ Pax. % Pax. %
5.5 1.0 8.7 1.2 10.9 1.4 2.3 0.4 15.6 1.5 13.5 1.2 21.4 1.8
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
Other Europe
Europe
Source: INS
6.0
138.4
60.7
8.6
19.2
56.1
25.7
9.5
10.5
1.1
26.2
11.5
1.6
3.6
10.6
4.9
1.8
2.0
9.4
179.6
117.1
9.0
24.8
80.5
38.5
11.0
12.4
1.3
24.4
15.9
1.2
3.4
10.9
5.2
1.5
1.7
9.7
175.4
120.0
8.2
27.6
96.1
40.4
11.7
11.3
12.9 2.4 13.6 1.8 13.8
1.3
23.2
15.9
1.9
3.7
12.7
5.4
1.6
1.5
4.7 0.8
132.1 23.5
95.0 16.9
6.3 1.1
19.0 3.4
78.3 13.9
26.9 4.8
8.9 1.6
6.1 1.1
1.8 11.9 2.1
156.3 29.6 206.4 28.1 202.1 26.8 156.1 27.7
18.0 3.4 24.3 3.3 24.8 3.3 15.2 2.7
19.1
205.4
241.2
13.8
36.5
112.2
51.9
12.7
23.2
16.5
268.0
52.4
1.8
19.2
22.6
1.3
3.4
10.5
4.9
1.2
2.2
26.0
220.5
255.3
13.9
45.0
110.9
54.6
15.4
25.9
- 12.4
1.5 17.0
- 9.0
25.1 285.7
4.9 37.6
527.4 99.7 735.3 99.9 752.0 100.5 562.8 100.0 1068.5 100.1 1142.7 100.0 1178.1
Belgium
Pax. %
2.3
19.3
22.3
1.2
3.9
9.7
4.8
1.3
2.3
1.1
1.5
0.8
25.0
3.3
39.7
225.2
228.5
14.6
46.8
109.7
65.0
15.3
29.6
27.5
19.6
22.2
294.1
18.9
3.4
19.1
19.4
1.2
4.0
9.3
5.5
1.3
2.5
2.3
1.7
1.9
25.0
1.6
100.0
TABLE B8
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - U.S.Citizens
1958 1959
Pax. % Pax. %
1960 1961 1962 1963 -
Pax. % Pax. % Pax. ___ Pax, - %
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
Other Europe
Europe
47.0
51.1
262.0
259.8
14.8
55.4
117.4
82.3
16.7
32.8
31.1
17.5
25.0
352.0
17.8
3.4
3.7
18.9
18.8
1.1
4.0
8.5
6.0
1.2
2.4
2.2
1.3
1.8
25.5
1.3
28.4
53.7
277.9
275.0
17.1
52.2
125.9
92.7
15.9
32.8
37.2
14.6
25.6
393.4
14.5
1.9
3.7
19.1
18.9
1.2
3.6
8.6
6.4
1.1
2.3
2.6
1.0
1.8
27.0
1.0
1382.7 100.1 1456.9 100.2
41.4
74.1
331.8
304.3
19.7
57.1
163.6
104.2
12.2
39.8
47.3
10.4
30.8
465.2
21.9
1723.8
2.4
4.2
19.2
17.7
1.1
3.3
9.5
6.0
0.7
2.3
2.7
0.6
1.8
27.0
1.3
30
73
315
310
21
67
165
103
15
43
55
11
39
457
30
.3 1.7 41,7
.7. 4.2 76.2
.9 18.1 367.6
.5 17.8 353.2
.8 1.3 26.2
- - 28.2
.6 3.9 74.4
.9 9.5 198.6
.7 6.0 114.3
.3 0.9 16.7
.7 2.5 49.6
.0 3.2 69.4
.0 0.6 11.7
.9 2.3 51.8
.8 26.3 509.6
.1 1.7 20.2
2.1
3.8
18.3
17.6
1.3
1.4
3.7
9.9
5.7
0.8
2.5
3.5
0.6
2.6
25.4
1.0
99.8 1742.2 100.0 2009.4 100.2
44.8
86.9
400.0
377.3
36.9
35.2
87.1
235.3
114.7
16.2
61.6
81.6
14.1
59.2
575.6
24.3
2.0
3.9
17.8
16.8
1.6
1.6
3.9
10.5
5.1
0.7
2.7
3.6
0.6
2.6
25.6
1.1
2250.8 100.1
Source: INS
TABLE B9
Breakdown of North Atlantic Traffic - U.S.Citizens
1964 1965
Pax. % Pax. %
1966
Pax. % Pax.
1967 1968
% Pax. %_
1969
Pax. %
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
Other Europe
Europe
53.8
90.7
413.0
428.0
38.0
45.9
109.7
258.0
126.1
14.9
78.4
99.4
15.6
76.1
657.0
24.1
2.1
3.6
16.3
16.9
1.5
1.8
4.3
10.2
5.0
0.6
3.1
3.9
0.6
3.0
26.0
1.0
62.2
-96.6
418.5
446.2
55.2
65.6
133.4
267.5
145.5
16.3
100.6
116.8
14.7
83.9
768.0
26.5
2.2
3.4
14.9
15.8
2.0
2.3
4.7
9.5
5.2
0.6
3.6
4.1
0.5
3.0
27.3
0.9
65.4
103.7
454.4
517.4
52.2
82.0
147.2
305.9
170.5
22,1
116.2
127.4
15.6
102.2
868.8
30.5
2529.1 99.9 2817.5 100.0 3181.5
2.1
3.3
14.3
16.3
1.6
2.6
4.6
9.6
5.4
0.7
3.7
4.0
0.5
3.2
27.3
1.0
80.4
118.0
438.7
565.7
68.9
90.0
184.8
344.8
196.4
32.4
146.5
151.5
16.1
117.0
963.5
33.1
100.2 3547.8
2.3
3.3
12.4
15.9
1.9
2.5
5.2
9.7
5.5
0.9
4.1
4.3
0.5
3.3
27.2
0.9
96.2
128.7
355.5
712.3
93.8
65.3
202.0
373.1
220.1
35.4
155.9
177.5
16.4
132.8
1039.7
69.1
2.5
3.3
9.2
18.4
2.4
1.7
5.2
9.6
5.7
0.9
4.0
4.6
0.4
3.4
26.8
1.8
99.9 3873.8 99.9
107.6
145.1
465.5
748.0
123.6
75.5
254.5
439.8
278.3
41.6
201.2
263.3
18.1
163.7
1271.2
90.6
2.3
3.1
9.9
16.0
2.6
1.6
5.4
9.4
5.9
-0.9
4.3
5.7
0.4
3.5
27.1
1.9
4687.6 99.9
Source: INS
TABLE B10
Composite Gross National Product of Europe
In Constant 1966 Prices
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
0.13
0.09
7.40
12.05
0.07
0.04
1.65
0.64
0.10
0.02
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
- Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom2l.52
Other Europe 0.87
0.17
0.12
8.94
9.15
0.03
0.05
2.01
0.73
0.11
0.02
0.24
0.14
9.45
5.17
0.03
0.07
2.54
0.92
0.12
0.03
0.31 0.32 0.37
22.43 26.28
1.36 1.35
0.17
0.13
9.31
6.30
0.04
0.18
0.15
9.26
8.87
0.07
0.24
0.18
9.30
11.80
0.09
0.07 0.06 0.06
3.58 4.29 4.24
0.90 0.95 1.02
0.11 0.11 0.09
0.03 0.03 0.03
- - 0.24
0.38 0.33 0.36
- - 0.08
26.44 23.76 21.74
1.38 1.88 0.29
44.89 45.44 46.71 48.84 50.57 49.76 50.42 51.44 54.03 56.82
Source: Appendix Tables B4,5,6 and B15,16
Country
0.23
0.30
9.71
10.19
0.04
0.07
3.32
1.20
0.10
0.06
0.42
0.35
0.19
24.03
0.21
0.28
0.38
9.77
9.80
0.05
0.07
3.76
1.12
0.10
0.05
0.53
0.31
0.22
24.89
0.11
0.29
0.40
9.79
10.22
0.04
0.07
3.28
1.41
0.10
0.05
0.59
0.25
0.24
27.19
0.11
0.33
0.47
10.36
11.02
0.05
0.07
3.71
1.52
0.07
0.05
0.57
0.16
0.25
27.98
0.21
Total
TABLE Bll
Composite Gross National Product of Europe
In Constant 1966 Prices
Country 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Belgium 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.63
Denmark 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.63
France 9.88 11.16 11.09 11.66 11.70 12.17 13.33 10.58 12.77
Germany 12.68 12.70 13.23 14.65 15.30 16.50 16.27 17.22 17.98
Greece 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.18
Iceland - 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Ireland 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
Italy 4.06 4.20 4.70 4.50 4.60 5.28 5.16 5.63 5.57
Netherlands 1.55 1.52 1.37 1.44 1.41 1.35 1.40 1.56 1.60
Norway 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09
Portugal 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.19
Spain 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.87 1.00 1.13 1.12 1.19 1.24
Sweden 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22
Switzerland 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.45 0.47
United Kingdom28.91 28.52 29.95 31.74 32.77 32.22 32.01 34.14 35.04
Other Europe 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.22 0.31
Total 59.54 60.53 62.97 66.92 68.85 70.74 71.60 72.92 77.05
Source: Appendix Tables B4,5,6 and B15,16
TABLE B12
National Income of European Countries
At Current Prices
(Billions)
Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece
schillings francs kroner france marks drachmas
1951 56.9 n.a 19.5 92.0 91.1 34.3
1952 64.3 n.a 20.7 109.4 103.8 35.7
1953 64.4 339.8 22.0 114.6 112.1 46.9
1954 73.0 355.3 22.9 122.3 121.1 53.8
1955 84.3 375.0 23.6 132.8 139.5 62.0
1956 92.5 398.9 25.1 148.4 154.4 72.4
1957 102.3 421.4 26.7 164.1 168.3 77.5
1958 106.8 423.9 27.7 188.6 180.1 79.9
1959 110.8 431.0 30.7 202.9 194.0 82.8
1960 125.0 458.3 33.1 227.0 229.8 88.4
1961 136.7 481.2 36.9 244,0 251.6 100.3
1962 143.7 514.7 41.3 280.0 271.9 105.5
1963 154.9 553.3 43.2 312.2 289.0 116.7
1964 167.9 621.7 49.5 343.5 316.5 129.9
1965 182.4 681.1 55.3 367.9 345.4 145.9
1966 197.3 723.6 60.1 398.4 364.7 160.0
1967 210.0 766.5 65.7 427.9 368.0 170.3
Source: United Nations. Ref.28
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TABLE B13
National Income of European Countries
At Current Prices
Iceland
kronaur(m)
1967
2217
2667
3226
3498
4094
4364
5133
5754
5463
6949
8397
10097
33218
15091
17534
17405
Ireland
pounds(m)
353.9
394.0
428.6
430.7
449.7
445.1
458.3
472-7
501.5
536.8
580.3
624.1
661.2
747.1
796.9
825.1.
886.0
Italy
1A b)
9017
10020
10607
11708
12660
13569
14652
15520
16754
1$528
20994
24161.
26503
28549
30841
33365
Netherlands
guilders(m)
16917
17689
19110
21565
24525
26498
29044
29560
31444
35149
37045
39591
43130
51079
56818
60970
66830
Norway
kroner(m)
14950
16274
16524
17863
18916
21395
22567
21926
23087
24680
26897
29004
31570
34805
38649
41390
45220
Portugal
escoudos(4
n.a
n.a
43.6
44.7
47.2
50.7
53.1
54.4
58.1
63.6
67.2
72.0
77.3
84.6
93.6
102.0
114.8
Source: Ref.28
160
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
TABLE B14
National Income of European Countries and U.S
At Current Prices
Spain
pesetas(b)
ni a
noa
n.a
294.6
327.7
376.7
439.5
508.5
523.1
532.7
609.5
709.6
841.3
946.2
1117.8
1274.6
1389.3
Sweden
kronor(m)
33960
37508
38008
40538
43194
46958
50659
53153
56393
60348
65715
70395
76463
85228
93714
101198
108660
Switzerland
franc8(m)
18885
19785
20660
21985
23400
24965
26450
27175
29230
31285
34920
38780
42320
46570
50145
54015
57625
United Kingdom
pounds(m)
11845
12762
13757
14751
15506
16839
17859
18667
19591
20905
22382
23416
24913
26863
28663
30009
31264
United States
dollars(b)
255.6
272.5
288.2
290.1
310.9
330.0
351.1
361.2
383.5
401.0
416.8
442.6
465.5
497.5
538.9
587.2
629.4
Source: United Nations. Ref.28 and Economic Report of the
President. Ref.14
161
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
TABLE B15
National Income Per Capita
In Current Dollars
1951 1952 1953
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K
U.S
316
695*
658
625
458
150
550
335
290
433
634
155*
128*
930
925
675
357
734*
693
736
510
154
595
375
305
450
690
166*
131
1020
955
725
357
776
731
770
543
200
645
406
335
478
685
178
151
1025
987
778
1954
405
805
754
810
580
22?
700
410
355
535
740
181
171
1090
1040
820
1955
465
822
770
876
648
260
758
430
385
60o
775
191
188
1150
1090
873
1956
510
895
814
967
726
302
820
430
420
640
868
204
215
1245
11.50
940
1957 1958 1959 1960
565 588 610 682
923
860
990*
779
320
890
445
447
694
900
213
250
1330
1200
990
936
888
1003
838
326
965
464
478
695
871
216
305
1400
1195
1012
950
980
1063*
880
334
1.040*
495
500
730
910
231
290
1470
1280
1080
1657 1736 1806 1786 1883 1980 2050 2075 2165 2219
* Estimated using historical growth rates.
Source: Appendix Tables B12,13 and 14
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1000
1.048
1120
1080
355
1130
520
540
800
962
250
292
1565
1360
1i45
TABLE B16
National Income Per Capita
In Current Dollars
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
1961 1962 1963
740 780 830
1050 1120 1191
116o 1285 1335
1180* 1240* 1321*
1165 1240 3254
400
1225*
577
591
935
958'
262
Spain 333
Sweden 1690
Switzerland 1480
U.K 1275
U.S 2268
416
1250*
620
670
930
1030
278
383
1805
1600
1260
2371
459
1269
650
763
996
1205
298
451
1950
1677
1300
2458
1964 1965 1966
9oo 965 1040
1320 1440 1519
1520 1690 1850
1420* 1520* 1634
1410 1510 1528
51.0
1400*
735
830
1170
1320
324
502
2160
1850
1420
2590
570
1520*
778
884
1270
1450
354
620
2350
1965
1510
2764
619
2080
801
949
1352
1544
380
667
2510
2059
1535
2982
1967
1104
1600
1947
1738
1512
651
1972
840
1020
1465
1673
423
707
2700
2171-
1560
3161
1968 1969
1195* 1290*
1680* 1770*
2080* 2140*
1850* 1980*
1640* 1760*
712* 780*
2140* 2320*
890* 942*
1100* 1190*
1580* 1700*
1775* 1885*
452* 472*
783* 870*
2890* 3100*
2270* 2400*
1675* 1800*
3419 3677
* Estima'ted using historical growth rates.
Source: Appendix Tables B12,13 and 14
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TABLE B17
Composite National Income Per Capita of Europe
In Current Dollars
Country 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Belgium 9.0 11.7 16.3 12.1 12.3 17.0 16.6 20.6 20.9 24.0
Denmark 9.9 13.2 16.1 15.1 16.9 21.2 36.1 45.3 49.0 57.6
France 91.3 125.9 135.5 134.5 137.5 144.1 146.5 145.4 149.9 155.7
Germany 115.4 89.8 50.0 60.3 84.9 118.3 103.6 103.9 106.5 129.6
Greece 4.1 2.0 2.2 3.0 5.7 7.6 3.5 4.2 3.7 3.9
Iceland n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Ireland 5.7 8.6 12.2 12.3 11.6 11.2 14.7 13.9 14.9 15.6
Italy 17.1 21.0 27.1 39.1 48.1 49.1 38.9 44.9 38.5 44.3
Netherlands 27.3 32.0 39.2 40.1 44.4 49.3 60.0 57.0 70.8 77.6
Norway 15.2 17.3 18.5 17.0 17.1 15.6 17.1 16.5 16.4 11.5
Portugal 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 4.7 4.3 3.9 4.5
Spain -.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3.7 7.3 10.7 11.6 10.8
Sweden 24.2 26.5 29.7 30.5 27.6 31.1 31.9 29.4 23.5 15.7
Switzerland n.a n,a n.a n.a n.a 9.2 22.8 26.3 28.2 29.9
U.K 209.9 235.6 284.0 289.5 268.0 260.4 297.0 313.7 349.9 364.1
Other Europel9.8 33.4 34.7 34.5 46.2 30.8 22.2 11.8 12.8 23.2
Total 550.6 619.0 667.6 690.4 722.4 771.0 823.3 847.9 900.5 968.0
Source: Appendix Tables B15 and 16 and B4,5 and 6
TABLE B18
Composite National Income Per Capita of Europe
In Current Dollars
Country 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Belgium 20.0 23.5 27.4 31.7 34.6 33.4 38.4 45.4 54.9
Denmark 67.3 73.2 74.8 83.6 93.0 90.8 99.3 108.2 107.0
France 149.9 166.2 167.8 178.9 183.9 196.1 219.0 194.3 217.8
Germany 152.6 156.2 159.3 186.1 197.8 210.9 205.6 226.3 242.9
Greece 4.4 4.6 5.5 5.6 5.7 10.5 14.3 17.1 17.9
Iceland n.a 26.3 33.0 43.4 56.2 72.8 65.1 42.8 41.8
Ireland 13.8 22.3 24.1 24.2 28.8 27.2 30.2 32.9 33.0
Italy 49.1 54.3 65.6 66.4 69.8 81.6 80.6 90.2 91.6
Netherlands 89.8 83.7 77.7 87.8 88.9 87.9 93.8 107.4 113.9
Norway 12.5 11.3 12.1 9.2 8.4 10.8 16.7 19.5 18.9
Portugal 4.2 4.4 5.4 5.8 6.4 9.5 10.2 11.8 12.7
Spain 14.3 14.2 16.7 20.6 27.3 30.7 31.1 34.5 37.4
Sweden 15.2 16.2 23.4 25.9 21.2 25.1 24.3 26.0 27.9
Switzerland 37.0 43.2 45.3 55.5 59.0 59.7 69.5 65.8 69.6
U.K. 405.4 391.9 406.9 444.5 477.2 469.7 468.0 517.6 550.8
Other Europe 13.6 14.4 13.9 16.7 16.5 12.9 16.3 29.8 45.5
Total 1049.1 1105.9 1158.9 1285.9 1374.7 1429.6 1482.4 1569.6 1683.6
Source: Appendix Tables B4,5,6 and Tables B15,16
TABLE B19
Total Composite National Income Per Capita
Traffic
Year % U.S. % European
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
51.8
59.7
61.4
52.0
56.3
63.4
61.0
63.0
62.3
62.6
61.2
61.7
63.7
60.8
62.0
62.3
61.5
61.9
62.9
48.2
40.3
38.6
48.0
43.7
36.6
39.0
37.0
36.7
36.4
38.8
38.3
36.3
39.2
38.0
37.7
38.5
38.1
37.1
Inc./Cap.
U.S. Europe
1657
1736
1806
1786
1881
1980
2050
2075
2165
2219
2268
2371
2458
2590
2764
2982
3161
3419
3677
551
619
668
690
722
771
823
848
901
968
1049
1106
1159
1286
1375
1430
1482
1570
1684
Weighted Inc./Cap.
U.S. Europe
858.3
1036.3
1108.9
928.7
1059.0
1255.3
1050.5
1307.3
134$.8
1389.1
1388.0
1462,9
1565.7
1574.7
1713.7
1857.8
1944.0
2116.4
2312.8
265.6
249.5
257.8
331.2
315.5
282.2
321.0
313,8
330.7
352.4
407.0
423.6
420.7
504.1
522.5
539.1
570.6
598.2
624.8
Total
1124
1286
1367
1260
1375
1538
1572
1621
1680
1742
1795
1887
1986
2079
2236
2397
2515
2715
2938
Source: Appendix Tables B14,15,16,17,18 and Text Table 2.1
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TABLE B20
Total Composite Gross National Product
Traffic
% U.S. % European
51.8
59.7
61.4
52.0
56.3
63,4
61.0
63.0
62.3
62.6
61.2
61.7
63.7
60.8
62.0
62.3
61.5
61.9
62.9
48.2
40.3
38.6
48.0
43.7
36.6
39.0
37.0
36.7
36.4
38.8
38.3
36.3
39.2
38.0
37.7
38.5
38.1
37.1
GNP
U.S. Europe
410.5
422.4
442.5
440.6
482.4
500.8
507.0
502.6
539.2
552.3
564.7
601.2
626.2
661.5
704,6
749.9
771.9
807.6
825.8
44.9
45.4
46.7
48.8
50.6
49.8
50.4
51.4
54.0
56.8
59.5
60.5
63.0
66.9
68.9
70.7
71.6
72.9
77.1
Weighted
U.S. Europe
212.6
252.2
271.7
229.1
271.6
317.5
309.3
316.6
335.9
345.7
345.6
370.9
398.9
402.2
436.9
467.2
474.7
499.9
519.4
21.6
18.3
18.0
23.4
22.1
18.2
19.7
19.0
19.8
20.7
23.1
23.2
22.9
26.2
26.2
26.7
27.6
27.8
28.6
Source: Appendix Tables B10,11 and Text Tables 2.1 and 3.5
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Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
GNP
Total
234
271
290
253
294
336
329
336
356
366
369
394
422
428
463
494
502
528
548
ft
TABLE B21
Forecast Total Composite National Income Per Capita
Traffic
% U.S. % European
Inc./Cap.
U.S. Europe
3846
4023
4208
4402
4605
4817
5039
5271
5513
5767
6032
6309
6599
6902
7219
7551
1792
1907
2029
2159
2297
2444
2600
2766
2943
3131
3331
3544
3771
4012
4269
4542
Weighted Inc./Cap.
U.S. Europe Total
2308
2414
2525
2641
2763
2890
3023
3163
3308
3460
3619
3785
3959
4141
4331
4531
717
763
812
864
919
978
1040
1106
1177
1252
1332
1418
1508
1605
1708
1817
3025
3177
3337
3505
3682
3868
4063
4269
4485
4712
4951
5203
5467
5746
6039
6348
Source: Text Section 5.2
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Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976,
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TABLE B22
Forecast Total Composite Gross National Product
Traffic GNP Weighted GNP
Year % U.S
1970 60
1971 60
1972 60
1973 60
1974 60
1975 60
1976 60
1977 60
1978 60
1979 60
1980 60
1981 60
1982 60
1983 60
1984 60
1985 60
Source: Text
% European
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
Section 5.2
U.S.
859
893
929
966
1005
1045
1087
1130
1175
1222
1271
1322
1375
1430
1487
1546
Europe
79
81
83
85
88
91
94
97
100
103
106
109
112
115
118
122
U.S. Europe
515
536
557
580
603
627
652
678
705
733
762
793
825
858
892
928
32
32
33
34
35
36
38
39
40
41
42
44
45
46
47
49
169
Total
547
568
590
614
638
663
690
717
745
774
804
837
870
904
939
977
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APPENDIX C
A- Brief Description of the Computer Program
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The regression analysis was performed using an ESP canned
computer program. ESP is a computer language for the statistical
analysis of time series by ordinary least squares and two-stage A
least squares. It is designed to carry out all the computational
steps which occur routinely in econometric research.
The basic unit of data within ESP is the variable, con-
sisting of N observations numbered from 1 to N. N may be any
number and may be different for different variables. ESP has a
general method for selecting a subset of the observations of
the time series it is operating upon. Through this facility, the
user has an easy method for handling groups of time series which
begin at different times.
The ESP has a number of special characteristics pertaining
to regression analysis. For example, it is possible to submit
variables in one format and regress in another. This procedure
generates new variables by performing arithmetic operations on
variables previously loaded or generated. For example, variables
can be "lagged" and logarithms can be taken before regression
takes place. The program can produce plots of actual and the
fitted or estimated values.
Following is a list of the output from ordinary least
. 29
squares regression.
1. Regression Coefficients.
b = (Z'Z) 
. Z'y
where :
b =vector of regression coefficients
Z = matrix of right hand variables
Z'= inverse Z
y = left hand variable
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2. Estimated Standard Errors
s=i ii
where V = variance-covariance matrix
t-statistic
b
t =_i_
1 s
4. i4ultiple Correlation Coefficient
2 e'e
R = 1-
where e= residuals = y-Xb
y= sample mean of y
F-statistic
F(N-3, T-N) =
where:
2
R /(N-I)
(I-R )/(T-N)
T = Number of observations
N = Number of Variables
6. Durbin-Watson Statistic
T
173
7. Sum of squared residuals
T 2
SSR = e
t
8. Standard Error of Regression
SSR
S =
I (T-N)
9. Variance-covariance Matrix
2 -1
V = s (Z'Z)
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APPENDIX D
The Impact of Aircraft Noise on Airline Economics
175
The purpose of this section is to highlight the impact of
aircraft noise regulation on airline economics. The analysis of
aircraft noise suppression is restricted to the production of
quieter engines through:
(a) New aircraft designs
(b) Retrofitting the existing aircraft
On January 11,1969, the U.S. Federal Administration issued
30,its Notice of Proposed Rule Making No. 69-1 (NPRM 69-1) . The
pertinent regulation is described below.
" Noise Measuring Points
(a) For takeoff, at a point 3.5 nautical miles from
the start of the takeoff roll on the extended
centreline of the runway.
(b) For approach, at a point one nautical mile from
the threshold on the extended centreline of the
runway; and
(c) For sideline, at a point, on a parallel line
with and 0.25 nautical miles from the extended
centreline of the runway; where the noise level
after lift-off is greatest.
Noise Levels
............ do not exceed the following:
(1) For approach and sideline, 108 EPNdB (effective
perceived noise decibels) for maximum weights of
600,000 lbs. or more, less 2 EPNdB per halving
of the 600,000 lbs. maximum weight down to 102
EPNdB for maximum weight of 75,000 lbs. and under.
(2) For takeoff, 108 EPNdB for maximum weights of
600,000 lbs. or more, less 5 EPNdB per halving
of the 600,000 lbs. maximum weight down to 93
EPNdB for maximum weights of 75,000 lbs. and
under."
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Subsonic Transport
The Aerospace Industries Association carried out an in-
depth study of the economic impact on the air transportation
31
industry of the above FAA NPRM 69-1. The study was performed in
two steps:
(1) Airplanes were designed for optimum performances only,
and the resulting noise levels evaluated (baseline
aircraft).
(2) Additional airplanes were designed for optimum per-
formance commensurate with the proposed noise requ-
latons to determine the resulting economic penalty
The results of one category of aircraft design (inter-
national high capacity subsonic) are described below. Table Dl
gives the baseline aircraft performance characteristics (i.e.,
aircraft designed without consideration to noise constraints).
The AIA study indicated that if the same aircraft were designed
with noise constraints as indicated in the NPRM 69-1, the direct
operating cost would increase by 7.4 percent. Furthermore, if the
same aircraft were designed to meet additional noise constraints,
say 5 EPNdB less than those stated in NPRM 69-1, the direct
operating cost would increase by 14.1 percent, An increase in
direct operating cost would produce either an increment in the
ticket price or a reduction in the airline profitability.
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing Aircraft Corporations have
been investigating the noise suppression problem through modi-
32.
fication of the existing aircraft engines. Poslusny summarizes
the result of these investigations in his thesis, some of the
findings of which are described in the following section.
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TABLE Dl
Baseline Aircraft Performance Characteristics
(High Capacity Subsonic - International Operations)
Number of Engines
Bypass Ratio
Payload-Full Pax. & Baggage
Range
Max. T.O. Field Length (S.L. 850F)
Min. Initial Cruise Alt. (Std. Day)
Mach No. (Long Range Cruise)
Max. Approach Speed
Pax, Split (% 1st Class/% Tourist)
Seat Pitch
Aisles
Performance Rules
4
5
400 Pax.
4830 NM
12,000 FT
33,000
0.84
145 KTS
15/85
38/34
2
1967 ATA
) Formula
Source: Table 1. of Ref.31
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The technique developed by McDonnell Douglas for noise
suppression consisted of an acoustically treated fan inlet and
fan duct. Specifically, their nacelle modifications were designed
to be employed for JT3D-3B powered DC-8-55 aircraft. Initial
tests have indicated that it is possible to have a reduction of
6-14 PNdB during landing. This reduction in the noise level
would be accompanied by an increment in the direct operating
costs, resulting from a) non-recurring fixed costs for retrofit
and b) recurring additional costs due to decreased aircraft
performance.
For the McDonnell Douglas modification, the cost of the
retrofit is estimated to be $545,000 per aircraft (4 new nacelles).
Coupled with this are the following changes in aircraft perfor-
mance: an increase in empty operating weight of 332 lbs., a 0.6
percent increase in cruise specific fuel consumption, a 2.1 per-
cent decrease in maximum cruise thrust, a 2.3 percent reduction
of takeoff thrust, and a 50 nautical mile reduction in maximum
range. The resulting changes in the direct operating cost are:
Category Increment in D.O.C
Crew 0.02 %
Insurance 0.38
Fuel 0.40
Maintenance 0.56
Depreciation 4.38
Total 5.74 %
Depreciation increases, due to the added cost of the
retrofit, represent the greatest increase in direct operating
costs. In these calculations the depreciation period was taken
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to be five years for the nacelles and 12 years for the aircraft.
A higher depreciation period would naturally reduce the operating
costs.
Boeing's approach to noise reduction through the 'use of
an acoustically treated modified nacelle was similar to that
of McDonnell Douglas, the major difference being that Boeing
designed a long-duct modification to be employed to JT3D-3B
powered 707-320B aircraft. The initial tests indicated the possi-
bility of a 9-16 PNdB reduction during approach and a 5-7 PNdB
reduction during takeoff. The cost for retrofit for this system,
including installation in 1972 dollars, was estimated to be
$900,000 and $1,150,000 per aircraft. Performance changed by a
5.1 percent increase in drag, an operating empty weight increase
of 3360 lbs., and a reduced range capability of 180 nautical
miles.
The results of Boeing's calculations indicated that there
would be a 7 to 10 percent increment in the direct operating
costs. These figures are almost solely a function of the $0.9
million and $1.15 million estimated retrofit costs and the five
year depreciation period.
Supersonic Transport
The engine noise history of the U.S. SST has been sum-
marized bya recent ad hoc committee in Reference 33. The same
noise level restrictions apply to the SST as to the subsonic
transport aircraft. The U.S SST is the first aircraft for which
the aircraft and the engines were strongly affected by environ-
mental considerations, in particular the aspect of community
noise. The SST engines had to be large and powerful in order to
deliver the necessary performance under supersonic cruise con-
ditions at high altitudes. To meet the stringent takeoff noise
180
requirement, the wing design was strongly influenced by the
necessity to attain sufficient altitude at a 3.5 nautical mile
reference point. Recent unexpected lift increases due to new
flap designhave improved the situation significantly. The improved
subsonic efficiency of the wing resulting from the takeoff
requirement helped the design in a number of ways, but at a small
cost in supersonic efficiency.
The approach requirement was less of a problem. The large
engine size permitted the efficient fitting of noise suppression
lining material in the intake to reduce the engine compressor
noise or "whine". In addition, the unique design of the variable-
geometry inlet permits the pilot to "choke" the inlet flow and
thereby further reduce the compressor noise which exhibits
particularly severe annoyance frequencies.
The most severe SST problem has been the sideline noise.
This was expected to be large, on the order of 119 EPNdB, because
the engine design utilized an afterburner (burning fuel down-
stream of the turbine) to meet the thrust requirement for takeoff.
In February, 1971, a basic change in the engine was announced: by
a slight increase in overall diameter, and with performance
improvements made possible by intensive research efforts, it
became possible to eliminate the use of the afterburner during
takeoff. This change reduced the basic jet-noise by about 5 EPNdB
below the prototype noise level. In addition, the cooler, lower
velocity jet permitted the use of a much more effective new jet-
noise suppressor reducing sideline noise by about 8 more EPNdB,
thereby making it possible within present technology to meet the
imposed noise requirements. The weight penalty of the redesigned
engines (partly offset by the improved flap design) is not ex-
pected to affect the original performance estimates for the pro-
duction design.
181
182
APPENDIX E
Application of the Model to Forecast
the Feasibility of the SST
183
This appendix contains the results of the model application
to determine the economic feasibility of the SST. In order to
answer the question, should the SST be developed, the following
additional assumptions are made.
(a) Assume that both the Concorde and The U.S. SST are
developed and meet all operating requirements such as
noise, sonic boom, etc.
(b) The aircraft operating costs are as shown in Table El.
(c) The average air fare on scheduled carriers declines
2 percent per year until 1974 and 1 percent per year
beyond 1974, as shown in Table 5.2. It is further
assumed that this fare level is the average for the
industry as a whole. This implies that if the SST is
to operate with a surcharge, then the subsonic fare
drop will be more than 1 percent per year, The subsonic
drop in fares will then be a function of the percentage
distribution of seats by aircraft type and the load
factor by aircraft type.
(d) The average annual load factor will be 50 percent for
the subsonic fleet and 70 percent for Concorde and the
U.S. SST.
(e) The percentage distribution of seats by aircraft type
is as shown in Table E2.
(f) The average transatlantic length of haul remains con-
stant at 3700 miles.
(g) The analysis excludes cargo carried on passenger flights.
Table E3 shows the total scheduled traffic as forecast in
Chapter V. This total traffic is separated into two groups,
subsonic and supersonic. The split is determined using the seat
breakdown by type of aircraft as shown in Table E2. The forecast
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TABLE El
Aircraft Operating Costs Per Available Seat-Mile
International Operations - 3500 Statute Miles
Direct Costs
Cents per available
seat-mile
Indirect Costs
Cents per available
seat-mile
Total Costs
Cents per available
seat-mile
Available Seats
B-707
0.99
1.31
2.30
160
Concorde U.S.SST
Source: Ref.19. Volume 1, page 59.
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B-747
0.81
1.30
2.11
380
1.36
1.20
2.56
124
1.07
1.12
2.29
285
TABLE E2
Percentage Distribution Seats by Aircraft Type
707/DC-8
90
70
50
30
747 Concorde U.S. SST
10
30
50
70
100
98
95
93
90
85
80
75
70
68
66
65
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Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TABLE E3
Forecast Traffic (000)
On Subsonic
Fleet
6179
6862
761.8
8122
9345
10144
10882
11777
1.2585
13212
13727
1.4338
14820
1591.2
17056
18539
On Supersonic
Fleet
210
573
886
1.398
2332
3432
4779
6351
7488
8787
9983
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Year
1970
1 971
1972
1.973
1974
1975
3976
1977
1978
1.979
1.980
1.981.
1 982
1983
1 984
1985
Total
6179
6862
7618
8122
9345
10354
11455
12663
13985
15544
17159
1.9137
211.71
23400
25843
28522
of passenger traffic is converted into available seats using 50
percent load factor for the subsonic and 70 percent for the
supersonic fleet. The available seats are shown in Table E4.
These available seats are then separated by type of aircraft
using the ratios of Table E2. The final results are shown in
Table E5.
Total operating costs are determined (Table E6) using the
cost estimates shown in Table El and a one-way length of haul
of 3700 miles. Total passenger revenue is obtained through the
product of the total number of passengers (traffic forecast -
Section 5.3)and the average projected fare (Section 5.2). Table
E7 shows the total passenger revenue, total operating expenses
and the gross operating profit through the year 1985.
The preliminary economic analysis shows that the SST should
be developed and should prove to be profitable. The analysis is
based on present projections of SST operating costs, and further-
more assumes that the SST will meet all operating requirements
such as noise constraints and public acceptance. The analysis
also assumes that enough R&D funds will be available to develop
the U.S. SST, that the project will not be scrapped as has
presently been announced and that the ATC system will be advanced
enough to accept all future aircraft movements, that is, the
system will be capable of handling both the growth in aircraft
movements as well as the change in the fleet mix.
As mentioned above, the analysis shown here considers only
the economics, and even from the point of view of economics, the
analysis is without sophistication and based on many assumptions.
However, accepting the assumptions and the novice approach, it
does seem feasible to introduce the SST.
Table El shows the direct and the indirect operating costs
per available seat-mile by aircraft type, as taken from an in-
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TABLE E4
Available Seats (000)
On Subsonic
Fleet
12358
1.3724
35236
16244
18690
20288
21764
23554
25370
26424
27454
28676
2764I 0
31824
3411.2
37078
On Supersonic
Fleet
300
819
1266
3 997
3331,
4903
6827
9073
1.0697
12553
14261
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Year
1.970
1971
3972
1.973
1974
1975
1 976
1977
1 978
1979
1.980
1981
1.982
1984
1985
lotal
1.2358
13724
1.5236
16244
18690
20588
22583
24820
271.67
29755
32357
35503
3871.3
42521.
46665
51339
TABLE E5
Available Seats by Type of Aircraft (000)
707/DC 8
11122
9607
7618
4873
1236
411.7
7618
1.1371
1.8690
20288
21.764
23554
25170
26424
27454
28676
29640
31824
341. 12
37078
Concorde
300
81.9
1266
1.997
3287
3677
4915
6049
6686
7384
8149
190
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1.974
1.975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1.982
1983
1984
1985
U.S. SSl'
44
1226
1912
3024
4011
5169
6112
TABLE E6
Total Operating Costs by Type of Aircraft ($M)
707/DC8
946
817
648
415
I-
B-747
97
322
595
888
1460
1.584
1700
1.840
1966
2064
21.44
2240
231.5
2485
2664
2896
Concorde
28
78
120
189
311.
348
465
573
633
699
772
US.SSTYear
1.970
1.971.
1972
1973
1 974
1.975
1976
1.977
1.978
1.979
3980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1 985
191
4
104
162
256
340
438
51.8
Total
1043
1139
1243
1303
1 460
1612
1778
1.960
2155
2379
2596
2867
3144
3458
3801
41.86
TABLE E7
Gross Operating Profit
Revenue ($R)
1.127
1228
1337
1.397
1574
1.729
1896
2076
2272
2502
2737
3020
3313
3627
3966
4335
Lxpenses ()
1043
1139
1243
1303
1460
1612
1778
1.960
2155
2379
2596
2867
3344
3458
3801
4186
192
Year
3970
1972
1973
1974
2975
1.976
1977
3978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
u r-atingF rof it ($ )
84
89
94
94
114
317
11.8
116
117
123
141
153
269
1.69
265
1.49
19depth study . The direct operating costs appear to be in line
with many other reports. However, the indirect operating costs
need some justification, for they are a function of the number
of passengers carried rather than a function of the type of
aircraft, as analyzed in the cited report. Furthermore, the
analysis assumes that these costs will remain constant. Costs
per available seat-mile have been declining steadily, as Figure
E.l shows for the two U.S. international carriers. This figure
also shows that indirect operating costs vary from airline to
airline just as in the case of the direct costs. It is anti-
cipated that the indirect costs will continue to decline in a
manner similar to the historical trend. The reductions will be
brought about as a result of further automation in the airline
industry and also possibly as a result of economies of scale.
These reductions in indirect operating costs should raise the
gross operating profit figures even further.
Projections of the individual cost elements are beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, it is interesting to note the re-
sult of the RAC19 study with regard to cost-factor sensitivity.
Figure E2 shows the sensitivity of the total operating costs to
changes in selected model parameters for the U.S. SST. This
exercise was conducted to provide insight into critical areas
of airline economics. The factors considered were: load factor,
aircraft price, fuel cost, aircraft utilization, aircraft seats,
and maintenance costs. Table E8 summarizes the result of a 10 %
change in each of these parameters.
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Figure E.1
Indirect Operating Costs
(per available seat-mile)
Current Dollars
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Figure E.2
Cost Sensitivity to Various Parameters
U.S, SST-Int'l Operations-2000 Miles
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Source: Ref. 19,Volume 1, page 46.
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TABLE E8
Percent Change in Total Cost from 10 % Change in Parameters -
International Operations
Parameter % Change in
Parameter
% Change in total
seat-mile cost
Load Factor +10
Aircraft Price +10
Fuel Cost +10
Utilization +10
Aircraft Seats +10
Maintenance +10
Source: Ref.19, Volume 1, page 47.
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+3.9
+1.9
+1.5
-1.5
-3.5
+1.2
